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I. INTRODUCTION
Rene Miller is a resident of “Duplin County, North Carolina—an area
known as the ‘hog capital of the world.’”1 She suffers from asthma and
sarcoidosis from bacteria and relies on a pacemaker to regulate her heart,
yet she is considered lucky.2 The alternative is cancer.3 The predictable
culprits are not to blame though; instead, her community’s deteriorating
health is the result of geographic location.4 Rene lives near one of the
largest waste lagoons in the country where hogs outnumber Duplin County
residents forty to one.5 To manage the disproportionately large hog
population, North Carolina’s pig Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs)6 regularly spray pig waste into the air7 and process dead hogs
into feed for consumption by other hogs.8
Although a century has passed since Upton Sinclair uncovered Chicago’s
abysmal slaughterhouse conditions,9 current industrial agricultural conditions
1. Julie Gueraseva, ‘What the Health’ Is a Startling Exposé of Corporate Greed
Trumping Public Health, LAIKA MAG. (June 1, 2017), https://www.laikamagazine.com/whatthe-health-film-exposes-truth/ [https://perma.cc/8P4D-A5FF].
2. WHAT THE HEALTH (AUM Films & Media 2017).
3. See Gueraseva, supra note 1.
4. See id.
5. Id. “[L]agoon” is a euphemism here; plainly, hog sewage in Duplin County is
channeled into mammoth cesspools. Burr Deming, Republicans and Hogs, the Tragedy
of the Commons, FAIRANDUNBALANCED (Apr. 27, 2017), http://fairandunbalanced.com/
?tag=rene-miller [https://perma.cc/A4YK-UGNX].
6. Douglas R. Tompkins, Foreword to THE CAFO READER: THE TRAGEDY OF
INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES, at ix, ix (Daniel Imhoff, ed. 2010).
7. Gueraseva, supra note 1; WHAT THE HEALTH, supra note 2.
8. WHAT THE HEALTH, supra note 2.
9. Sinclair’s 1906 work, The Jungle, exposed the terrible meatpacking conditions
for animals and immigrants. Karen Olsson, Welcome to the Jungle: Does Upton Sinclair’s
Famous Novel Hold Up?, SLATE (July 10, 2006, 12:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
arts/books/2006/07/welcome_to_the_jungle.html [https://perma.cc/Q7W9-TWHV]. The
book ultimately aided in the passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act later that year.
Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, FDA (Feb. 1, 2018), https://
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are still deeply unsatisfactory.10 At the time, the government ultimately
considered Sinclair’s exposé a worthy cause for change, but today the
government tends to give the benefit of the doubt to corporations.11
Consumer hope may be on the horizon, however. Recently, the Central
Division of the United States District Court of Utah held a Utah “ag-gag”
law—a law criminalizing covert agricultural investigations12—unconstitutional
after an undercover environmentalist was charged for revealing the incidence
of a bulldozer moving a sick cow outside a slaughterhouse.13
The rise of consumer misinformation and food-borne illness due to
substandard agricultural industrial practices14 has led agricultural corporations
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/FOrgsHistory/EvolvingPowers/ucm054819.htm [https://
perma.cc/FS66-GBE6].
10. See generally Continuing Problems in USDA’s Enforcement of the Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-111hhrg65127/html/CHRG-111hhrg65127.htm [https://perma.cc/MY8Q-WKN7]
(discussing flaws in the federal government’s inspection system).
11. For example, several states including Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Iowa,
Missouri, Idaho, and North Carolina, have passed so-called “ag-gag” legislation that
makes it difficult for whistleblowing employees or employee advocacy groups to expose
animal cruelty or food safety violations on factory farms. Marshall Tuttle, Note, Finally
a Solution? How Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter Could Affect the Constitutionality
of Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, 21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237, 238 (2016). Thus, some argue the true
aim of ag-gag legislation is to conceal abuse from the public. See, e.g., Cody Carlson, The
Ad-Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public Scrutiny, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factoryfarm-abuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674/ [https://perma.cc/3ZDN-VCZP].
12. Former New York Times columnist Mark Bittman first coined the term “ag-gag” in
2011 to describe a series of state bills appearing across the country that criminalized
photographing and video recording inside agricultural facilities. Mark Bittman, Who
Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:29 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/ [https://perma.cc/9KR9-HK6Q]. Ag-gag
laws typically include one or more of the following elements: (1) “[p]rohibiting documentation,”
(2) ”[p]rohibiting misrepresenting oneself in order to gain access to an animal agriculture
facility,” and (3) “[r]equiring the quick reporting to authorities of illegal animal cruelty.”
CHIP GIBBONS, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AG-GAG ACROSS AMERICA: CORPORATEBACKED ATTACKS ON ACTIVISTS AND WHISTLEBLOWERS 6 (2017), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/
default/files/attach/2017/09/Ag-GagAcrossAmerica.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA3Q-U3HR].
13. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1213 (D. Utah 2017).
The Animal Legal Defense Fund’s complaint represented the first legal challenge to any
ag-gag law in the United States. Samantha Morgan, Note, Ag-Gag Challenged: The Likelihood
of Success of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert’s First Amendment Claims, 39 VT.
L. REV. 241, 241 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Microbiology, Foodborne Illness Cause by Common
Agricultural Practice, Casts Doubts on Biocidal Product Labeling, SCI. DAILY (Apr. 17,
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to respond in a myriad of ways. On occasion, contamination is purely
accidental, and corporations who regularly take every precaution respond
diligently and apologetically.15 On the other end of the spectrum,
corporations’ inadequate precautions may actually cause illness.16 Moreover,
because outbreaks rarely occur, these corporations have little incentive to
implement better practices when doing so would sacrifice efficiency and
ultimately, profits.17 Corporations who reside in states with ag-gag laws
and benefit from them have especially little incentive to take care.18
2018), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/180417100538.htm [https://perma.cc/
Y64K-HF4H] (“Chlorine, commonly used in the agriculture industry to decontaminate
fresh produce, can make foodborne pathogens undetectable . . . .”); S.E. Smith, How
Industrial Agriculture Promotes Foodborne Illness and Makes Us Sick, CARE2 (May 6,
2018), https://www.care2.com/causes/how-industrial-agriculture-promotes-foodborneillness-and-makes-us-sick.html [https://perma.cc/2UUA-S52X] (“Certain practices associate
with industrial agriculture can increase the risk of foodborne illnesses—an even outright
promote them.”). “In 2016, 839 foodborne disease outbreaks were reported, resulting in
14,259 illnesses, 875 hospitalizations, 17 deaths, and 18 food product recalls.” DANIEL
DEWEY-MATTIA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMERGING & ZOONOTIC INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR FOODBORNE DISEASE
OUTBREAKS UNITED STATES, 2016: Annual Report 1 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/fdoss/pdf/
2016_FoodBorneOutbreaks_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVW9-T6Z3].
15. One such corporation is the restaurant chain, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Following its two E. coli outbreaks in 2015, the exposure of which caused the company a
substantial revenue drop, Chipotle took aggressive measures to remedy the food safety
issue and apologize to customers. Daniel B. Kline, Here’s Everything Chipotle Has Done
to Handle Its E. Coli Crisis; Is It Enough?, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 10, 2016, 5:40 PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/10/heres-everything-chipotle-has-doneto-handle-its-e.aspx [https://perma.cc/6J8H-ZEKT].
16. See, e.g., April K. Bogard et al., Ground Beef Handling and Cooking Practices
in Restaurants in Eight States, 76 J. FOOD PRODUCTION 2132, 2132 (2013) (“This study
revealed the pervasiveness of risky ground beef handling policies and practices in restaurants
and the need for educational campaigns targeting food workers and managers.”); Laura
Green Brown, EHS-Net Restaurant Food Safety Studies: What Have We Learned?, J.
ENVTL. HEALTH, Mar. 2013, at 44, 44–45 (“[R]estaurants . . . are an important source of
foodborne illness outbreaks; half of all foodborne illness outbreaks are associated with
restaurants . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., DIV. OF FOODBORNE,
BACTERIAL & MYCOTIC DISEASES, NAT’L CTR. FOR ZOONOTIC, VECTOR-BORNE & ENTERIC
DISEASES, SURVEILLANCE FOR FOODBORNE-DISEASE OUTBREAKS—UNITED STATES, 1998–
2002 (2006))); Denis W. Stearns, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Curtain:
Concealment, Revelation, and the Question of Food Safety, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1399,
1407–08 (2015).
17. See Michael Ollinger & Nicole Ballenger, Weighing Incentives for Food Safety
in Meat and Poultry, USDA (Apr. 1, 2003), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2003/
aril/weighing-incentives-for-food-safety-in-meat-and-poultry/ [https://perma.cc/WW3JYU8T] (“The legal liability system forces produces to make food safety investments up to
the point at which the probability that the plant’s products would be identified as the cause
of an illness would be . . . very low. However, the incentives of the legal system limit food
safety investment.”).
18. For example, an ag-gag law can provide a corporation practicing inhumane
treatment of animals with advanced warning before serious enforcement action follows.
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Instead, some corporations cheerlead ag-gag legislation, while raking in
abundant profits.19 In these cases, the savvy consumer would wisely assume a
corporation has something to hide.20
Ideally, well-meaning, ethical producers could gain recognition and instill
consumer trust. To some degree, food labels provide such recognition;
however, the American consumer deserves more comprehensive reform.21
Offering agricultural companies the opportunity to belong to a new class
of benefit corporations would improve consumer information while
incentivizing transparent agricultural standards.22 Under traditional corporate
law, benefit corporations are not required to maximize profits for shareholders
and instead may prominently focus on the pursuit of social or environmental
missions.23 Consequently, benefit corporations do not expose corporate
directors to the risk of lawsuits from shareholders interested in profits
alone.24

Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse: Rapid Reporting and
the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 368 (2015).
19. Monsanto was one such corporation when it lobbied for ag-gag legislation in
Iowa. See Rita Lobo, The Pros and Cons of Ag-Gags, NEW ECON. (June 11, 2013), http://
www.theneweconomy.com/business/thepros-and-cons-of-ag-gags [https://perma.cc/W964QLGQ]. As the world’s largest agricultural biotechnology corporation with a net worth in
2016 of $1.37 billion, Monsanto can easily afford to lobby for ag-gag laws. See Arathy S.
Nair, Monsanto Beats Thanks to Strong Demand for Its Soybean and Corn Seeds, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2017, 8:44 AM), www.businessinsider.com/monsanto-earnings-q2-20172017-4 [https://perma.cc/3GYF-STVW].
20. See James Bennet et al., Eating with Our Eyes Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/opinion/eating-with-our-eyes-closed.html [https:/
/perma.cc/ZN9S-8HDC].
21. See Zak Franklin, Giving Slaughterhouses Glass Walls: A New Direction in
Food Labeling and Animal Welfare, 21 ANIMAL L. 285, 307–13 (2015); see also infra Part
IV.
22. See Ryelle Seymour, Note, Food Deserts Are Ripe for Business, 44 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 421, 421 (2017) (proposing the reformation of food desert agriculture through
traditional benefit corporation structure); see also William Semaan, Note, Cultivating
Capital: A Look at the Issues Affecting Urban Farms as a Business and How New
Innovative Policy Changes at the Federal and State Level Will Impact the Financial
Sustainability of Urban Farms, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 317, 338–39 (2014) (proposing
the utilization of traditional benefit corporation laws to support the unique interests of
urban farms).
23. Shelly Alcorn, Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change, ASAE,
https://foundation.asaecenter.org/asae-home/resources/articles/an_magazine/2012/april-may/
benefit-corporations-a-new-formula-for-social-change [https://perma.cc/DE5H-TJPX].
24. Id. (“Benefit corporations create a ‘safe harbor’ for boards of directors who take
interests other than profit into account when making decisions on the corporation’s behalf.”).
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First, Part II will discuss the current array of agricultural industry standards—
many of which negatively impact consumer health—to emphasize the
value that offering tailored benefit corporation status to agricultural producers
would provide to the American people. Part III will then discuss the link
between transparent standards and accountable food safety. Next, Part IV
will address existing food safety regulations and the argument that they
adequately inform consumers. Part V will discuss the evolution of benefit
corporations, highlighting recent debate that all benefit corporations should
qualify for tax incentives. Lastly, Part VI proposes the enactment of a federal
statute classifying a new type of benefit corporation tailored toward the
ultimate goals of incentivizing safe and transparent agricultural practices
and comprehensively informing consumers.
II. CURRENT INDUSTRY STANDARDS
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a federal agency under the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that enforces laws
regulating the safety of food and drugs.25 The Food and Drugs Act of 1906
was the first of its kind to target public health and consumer protections.26
“[A]fter a legally marketed toxic elixir killed 107 people,” Congress
passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act of 1938, which
“authorized the FDA to demand evidence of safety for new drugs, issue
standards for food, and conduct factory inspections.”27 In 1962, Congress
passed the Kefauver–Harris Amendments to the FD&C Act28 following

25. FDA Organization, FDA (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/default.htm [https://perma.cc/PZ2W-WXG6]; Laws Enforced by FDA,
FDA (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/
default.htm [https://perma.cc/3LLH-DNHZ]; The History of FDA’s Fight for Consumer
Protection and Public Health, FDA (June 29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
History/default.htm [https://perma.cc/5LV3-4UVY] (“FDA’s modern regulatory functions
began with the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act . . . .”); see Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301–99 (2012)).
26. Laws Enforced by FDA, supra note 25.
27. Id.; see generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (originally enacted as Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1983).
28. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendments), Pub. L. No. 87781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–81
(2012)).
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the thalidomide tragedy.29 The amendments tightened restrictions surrounding
the regulation of drugs sold in the U.S.30
Although the FDA ensures the safety of most food and drugs, including
animal drugs and feed, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) primarily
regulates the safety of meat, poultry, and some egg products.31 Under this
department, the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) governs meat
inspection.32 Despite the seemingly clear division of regulation—USDA
for meat products and FDA for nonmeat products—many products do not
follow this regime.33 For example, the FDA regulates milk and fish—

29. Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FDA (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm322856.htm [https://perma.
cc/48K4-LPYN]. The sedative thalidomide held massive appeal in Europe by 1961, as it
was the only sedative at the time not acting as a central nervous system depressant. Bara
Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, HELIX
(July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drugsafety-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/B558-NYCL]. Its maker claimed the drug was
“completely safe” and recommended use to pregnant women for the relief of morning
sickness. Id. However, many mothers who took the drug ultimately gave birth to babies
with phocomelia, resulting in “flipper-like limbs.” Id. The FDA inspector during this time
equated the tragedy with a “lack of data indicating whether the drug could cross the
placenta.” Id. The egregious effects of this legal drug ultimately catalyzed U.S. drug regulation
reformation. Id.
30. Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note
29. The amendments required manufacturers to prove that their products were both safe
and effective before they were marketed. Id. Today, drug approval can take years and
may require animal testing and human clinical trials. Indep. Inst., The Drug Development
and Approval Process, FDA REV., http://www.fdareview.org/issues/the-drug-developmentand-approval-process/ [https://perma.cc/NJU2-P4UZ].
31. Gretchen Goetz, Who Inspects What? A Food Safety Scramble, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/12/who-inspects-what-afood-safety-scramble/#.WkrU39-nE2w [https://perma.cc/YUJ3-UBDG]. The USDA regulates
meat and meat products, in cooperation with the states, to ensure “wholesome, not adulterated,
properly marked, labeled, and packaged” meat products. 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2018); U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUMMARY OF FEDERAL INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MEAT PRODUCTS
(2015), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/e6658a9c-915f-4283-beaf-a827b35e906a/
Fed-Food-Inspect-Requirements.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/HGV2-UNZG].
32. The FMIA “directs USDA to inspect the sanitary conditions of meat processing
plants and to ‘prescribe the rules and regulations of sanitation under which these establishments
are maintained.’” Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting
21 U.S.C. § 608). The FMIA specifically requires that “the Secretary shall cause to be
made by inspectors appointed for that purpose a post mortem examination and inspection
of the carcasses and parts thereof of” all livestock. 21 U.S.C. § 604.
33. See Goetz, supra note 31.
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except for catfish, which the USDA regulates.34 Regardless, the Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) enforces the regulation of all products
under the USDA’s authority.35 Furthermore, regulations enacted under
the FDA are inapplicable to proceedings under the FMIA, and the FMIA
does not define adulteration under the FDA.36
Currently, neither the USDA nor the FSIS requires food producers to
comprehensively disclose content and practice information to consumers.
For example, from taste or appearance alone, the average person would
probably not know the difference between milk from cows treated with
the hormone recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST), which increases
milk production, and cows not treated with rbST37 or the difference between
AquAdvantage salmon and other farmed Atlantic salmon.38 Because the
FDA concludes there is minimal difference between the two variations of
products, it does not require companies to flag these distinctions.39 Although
34. Id.; see also Food Guidance & Regulation, FDA (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
Food/GuidanceRegulation/ [https://perma.cc/R596-ZAAB].
35. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE: PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTING FOODBORNE ILLNESS 1 (2013), https://www.fsis.usda.
gov/wps/wcm/connect/7a35776b-4717-43b5-b0ce-aeec64489fbd/mission-book.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES [https://perma.cc/J7QE-3MMJ]; see also 9 C.F.R. §§ 381.76–.94 (2018). The
FMIA requires FSIS inspectors to mark all carcasses found to be not adulterated as
“Inspected and passed,” or marked with the USDA legend, and all those found to be
adulterated as “Inspected and condemned.” 21 U.S.C. § 604; see also 9 C.F.R. §§ 310.5,
310.8, 381.79. If the FSIS inspector finds any condition “that might render the meat or
any part unfit for food purposes,” the carcass must be retained for veterinary disposition.
9 C.F.R. § 310.3 (2018). All inspected and condemned adulterated carcasses must be
destroyed “in the presence of an inspector.” 21 U.S.C. § 604.
36. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–24; see also generally id. § 342; United States
v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481
(10th Cir. 1984) (describing the separation of regulation between meat products and other
food, drugs, and cosmetics).
37. See Kitchen Daily, Organic Milk vs. Regular Milk: Which Tastes Better?, LIFE
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/milk-taste-test_n_1213895 [https://perma.cc/
BJG6-J5EE] (“‘They taste more or less exactly the same.’ . . .There is not a huge taste
difference between organic milk compared to [rbST treated cow] milk.”). RbST, which
also refers to recombinant bovine growth hormone (rbGH), is an animal drug application—
hormone—that the FDA approved in 1993 for use in lactating dairy cows to increase the
production of marketable milk. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 632, 634
(6th Cir. 2010).
38. See Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
“Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 422–23 (2016) (“The [FDA] has determined that
there is ‘no biologically relevant difference’ between AquAdvantage salmon and other farmed
Atlantic salmon . . . .”).
39. Boggs, 622 F.3d at 637; Adler, supra note 38 (citing CTR. FOR VETERINARY
MED., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AQUADVANTAGE
SALMON: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1–2 (2015), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/
20171101203725/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentAppr
ovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM466218.pdf).
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some states go the extra mile by regulating the practices government agencies
have yet to regulate, consumers living outside of these states are left in the
dark.40
Although full disclosure is not an industry standard, regulatory silencing of
independent disclosure is on the rise. Such regulations often come in the
form of ag-gag laws, which criminalize covert filming or photography on
agricultural farms.41 The first ag-gag laws arose in the 1990s, and, despite
the defeat of proposed legislation in sixteen states, new legislation has
passed in five states since 2011, bringing the current number of states with
ag-gag laws to nine.42 Although organizations like the Center for Constitutional
Rights assert ag-gag laws are clearly unconstitutional,43 ag-gag laws have
proliferated. For example, in March 2017, Arkansas lawmakers passed
House Bill 1665, broadly allowing a cause of action for unauthorized access
to another’s property.44 The Arkansas bill allows businesses to file lawsuits
against people who share documents, pictures, videos, or recordings that
damage these businesses if taken from nonpublic areas.45 Such general

40. For example, Vermont is one of few states to require that milk handlers separate
the milk from cows not treated with rbST from other milk, despite the FDA’s lack of
regulation on the matter. 20-021-005 VT. CODE R. §§ 5.1, 6.1 (2018). However, in 1996,
Vermont lost its battle requiring dairy producers to label milk from hormone-treated cows
after conceding that the rbST disclosure was not related to any health or safety concerns.
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1996). The court held
that Vermont’s interest was nothing more than gratification of “consumer curiosity,”
which did not meet any known test under the First Amendment. Id. at 74. Perhaps
Vermont’s concession was its downfall, for consumer worries about possible adverse
health effects from consumption of rbST is seemingly a substantial interest worthy of First
Amendment protection. See id. (Leval, J., dissenting). Elanco, the producer of rbST—
which is sold as a “treatment for dairy cattle” under the name Posilac—provides various
warnings that cows may experience reproductive and digestive disorders. Elanco Animal
Health Co., Eli Lilly & Co., Posilac, DRUGS.COM (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.drugs.
com/vet/posilac.html [https://perma.cc/4KWW-75CW]; see also ELANCO, POSILAC (2010),
https://assets.ctfassets.net/fistk1blxig0/200AfTdbQIM0AqmWWWKoQ6/b7a1e06ac011
52a4dae71dadb78f031b/Posilac.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2BJ-P4DT].
41. GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 2, 6.
42. Id. at 2; see supra note 11.
43. GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 25–26.
44. H.B. 1665, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-118-113 (2018).
45. ARK. CODE § 16-118-113(c). Companies can sue for up to $5000 a day in
damages for each day of violation. Id. § 16-118-113(e)(4). Although the law applies to
employees, it excludes law enforcement officers conducting investigations, state agencies,
institutes of higher education, and healthcare providers. Id. § 16-118-113(g).
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language prohibits whistleblowers from exposing animal abuse, or even
child abuse, if witnessed on private property.46
Despite such unsavory advances in ag-gag legislation, there have been
many victories worth noting. In 2015, for example, the United States
District Court of Idaho held an Idaho law criminalizing interference with
agricultural production facilities unconstitutional for violating First
Amendment free speech protections and the Equal Protection Clause.47
46. Why Are Ag-Gag Laws Harmful?, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/
issue/ag-gag/ [https://perma.cc/5C23-JBE6] (“‘Ag-Gag’ laws seek to ‘gag’ would-be
whistleblowers and undercover activists by punishing them for recording footage of what
goes on in animal agriculture. They were originally designed to prevent the public from
learning about animal cruelty. More recently . . . states are passing laws [that also] criminalize
whistleblowing in . . . any private business including hospitals . . . and schools.”); see also
Shawnya Meyers, Controversial New Arkansas ‘Ag Gag’ Law Could Penalize
Whistleblowers, 5NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017 5:07 PM), http://5newsonline.com/2017/03/27/
controversial-new-arkansas-ag-gag-law-could-penalize-whistleblowers/ [https://perma.cc/
YJ88-PWF6].
47. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1202 (D. Idaho 2015),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.
2018). But see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 909, 928–29
(S.D. Iowa 2018) (holding that an Iowa ag-gag law criminalizing “agricultural production
facility fraud” satisfied rational basis review). The Ninth Circuit partially reversed the
Otter district court’s holdings in 2018. See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1190. The court affirmed
the lower court’s ruling that the Idaho statute violated the First Amendment with regard to
(1) criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility (APF) by misrepresentation
and (2) prohibiting a person from entering a private APF without express consent from the
facility owner and making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an APF’s operations.
Id. at 1194, 1203–06. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s remaining
holdings and found that the statute did not violate the First Amendment or Equal Protection
clauses with regard to (1) criminalizing obtaining records of an APF by misrepresentation
and (2) criminalizing obtaining employment with an APF by misrepresentation with the
intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility’s operations, property, or personnel.
Id. at 1194, 1199–1201, 1203–05. The Ninth Circuit based its decision on United States
v. Alvarez, in which the Supreme Court ruled that “a false statement made in association
with a legally cognizable harm or for the purpose of material gain is not protected.” Id. at
1199 (citing 567 U.S. 709, 719, 722–23 (2012) (plurality opinion)). First, the Ninth Circuit
explained that obtaining
records by misrepresentation inflicts a ‘legally cognizable harm’ by impairing
an [APF] owner’s ability to control who can assert dominion over, and take possession
of, his property. Additionally, obtaining records through misrepresentation may
also . . . expos[e] proprietary formulas, trade secrets, or other confidential
business information to unwanted parties.
Id. (citing Idaho Code § 48-801 (2018)). Arguably, the extent to which misrepresentation
affects dominion of an APF’s property or exposes trade secrets is variable. To the extent
that an individual’s conscious presence—and nothing more—at an APF equals dominion,
misrepresentation causes no cognizable harm. Likewise, an individual may perceive a
practice harmful to animals without otherwise exposing trade secrets. As such, subsection
(1)(b) of the Idaho statute, if upheld, should at the very least require narrow tailoring so as
not to chill speech. See IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(b) (2018); see also Ashcroft v. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). Second, to uphold the criminalization of
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Additionally, between 2012 and 2014, ag-gag bills in twenty states were
defeated.48
In 1966, federal law began regulating the “humane care and treatment”
of animals used for research, exhibition, and interstate commerce,49 yet
laws enacted since then starkly contrast with any alleged priority of
compassion. In 2006, Congress effectively codified ag-gag at the federal
level by introducing what is now the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
(AETA).50 Animal rights activists criticized the act—deemed the “Green
Scare”—as the government’s attempt “to conflate animal rights and
environmental activism with terrorism.”51 Indeed, many state lawmakers
have attempted “to chill, repress, and criminalize activism” by stirring up
fears of “eco-terrorism.”52 Similar to the Arkansas law, the overly-broad
misrepresentation for material gain, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Alvarez plurality
which stated that “where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other
valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that the Government
may restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.” Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1201
(quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723). However, individuals who misrepresent themselves
to gain employment at an APF with the larger intention of reporting malfeasance likely
agree to receive pay collaterally. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s application of Alvarez
in this context convolutes the notion of criminalizing misrepresentation for criminal gain.
Although the court acknowledged that “the goal of undercover employment-based
investigations [may not be] to ‘secure moneys or other valuable considerations’ for the
investigator, but rather to expose threats to the public,” the court nevertheless concluded
that the compensation aspect of employment implements Alvarez. Id. at 1201–02 (quoting
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723). Therefore, the statute, if upheld, should require narrow tailoring
because the statute should only criminalize misrepresentation where “false claims are
made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations.” Id. at 1201
(quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723). And in the latter case, securing moneys must not be
collateral to the intent of the misrepresentation. Otherwise, little would prevent the
criminalization of harmless resume fibs that consequently lead to employment. See Alvarez,
567 U.S. at 723; Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195–96.
48. GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 22. In 2015, for example, the Arizona State
Legislature passed ag-gag legislation. Id. However, a joint campaign by advocates for
animal welfare and constitutional liberties ultimately led the Arizona governor to veto the
bill. Id. Similarly, in 2013, a proposed California ag-gag bill was ultimately withdrawn
after widespread media opposition. Id. at 22–23.
49. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA
ANIMAL CARE: ANIMAL WELFARE ACT AND ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS 1 (2017),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/AC_BlueBook_AWA_FINAL
_2017_508comp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV74-NEYL].
50. See Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2018).
51. GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 4.
52. Id. In 2012, Senator Jim Patrick, sponsor of Idaho’s Agricultural Security Act,
equated undercover investigations with “terrorism that has been used by enemies for
centuries to destroy the ability to produce food and the confidence in the food’s safety.”
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language of the AETA threatens to limit free speech that serves the public
interest.53
In recent years, states have proposed new legislation to complement
failing ag-gag laws. Mandatory—or “rapid”54—reporting laws require
those who witness illegal animal cruelty to report it to authorities within
a short period of time.55 These laws are especially problematic because
they bear the semblance of virtuous intent—protecting animals.56 While
seemingly benign, such laws require investigators to out themselves,
inhibiting them from continuing more fruitful investigations in the future
and enabling industry reporters “to dismiss individual violations as
aberrations.”57
The question is, how do such broadly-written statutes succeed? Perhaps
the threat of chilled free speech is less recognizable in successful ag-gag
laws because most have detailed language with only a few problematic
lines.58 The more concise rapid reporting laws have likely succeeded for
the opposite reason: they are brief and feign animal protection.59 Both aggag and rapid reporting laws threaten to leave consumers in the dark by
silencing opposition. Thus, transparency is critical to shed light on undercover
scandals rampant in the agricultural industry.

Id. at 17 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1200 (D. Idaho
2015)).
53. The AETA broadly punishes those who cause the loss of records, requiring “the
replacement costs of lost or damaged property or records.” 18 U.S.C. § 43. Additionally,
the AETA punishes
[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . for the purpose of damaging
or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; and . . . in connection
with such purpose . . . intentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or
personal property (including animals or records) used by an animal enterprise,
or any real or personal property of a person or entity having a connection to,
relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise.
Id. § 43(a).
54. Shea, supra note 18, at 340.
55. GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 6. Missouri passed the first rapid reporting ag-gag
statute in the country in 2012, making it a class A misdemeanor for failing to report farm
animal abuse or neglect to law enforcement within twenty-four hours of recording the
abuse. See MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2018).
56. See GIBBONS, supra note 12, at 6; Shea, supra note 18, at 340.
57. GIBBONS, supra note 12.
58. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2018).
59. See, e.g., MO. STAT. § 578.013.
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III. WHY TRANSPARENCY PROMOTES SAFETY AND
BETTER-INFORMED CONSUMERS
A. The Need for Transparency: Critical Cases
In 2008, the revelation of California’s Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing
Company taking downer cows to slaughter60 highlighted the critical need
for agricultural transparency. In an undercover operation, the Humane
Society of the United States recorded “workers kicking sick cows and
using forklifts to force them to walk” to their deaths.61 The USDA bans
the sale of meat from downer cows because consumption of the meat
poses “an increased risk of E. coli, salmonella, and mad cow disease.”62
Despite the recall of 143.4 million pounds of beef at Hallmark—the vast
majority of which had already been consumed—the incident only resulted
in a Class II recall.63
Class II recalls involve situations “where there is a remote probability
of adverse health consequences from the product.”64 Class I recalls, in
contrast, are the most serious and involve situations “where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health
consequences or death.”65 More alarming than the classification of the
60. Andrew Martin, Largest Recall of Ground Beef Is Ordered, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18recall.html [https://perma.cc/8G28DD43]. Downer cows raise “questions about the safety of . . . meat, because [they] cannot
walk [and] pose an added risk of diseases including mad cow disease. The federal
government had banned downer cows from the food supply.” Id.
61. Id.
62. Lobo, supra note 19.
63. CYNTHIA BROUGHER & JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE USDA’S
AUTHORITY TO RECALL MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS 13 (2011), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL34313.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY96-7ZBB]. The USDA
issued a Class II recall because the cows had already passed pre-slaughter inspection.
FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CALIFORNIA FIRM RECALLS
BEEF PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM NON-AMBULATORY CATTLE WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
PROPER INSPECTION 1 (2008), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/8c3e741f-4d494530-812c-72a65ea50e43/Recall_005-2008_Release.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/
JC44-ET6H]. Additionally, the USDA relied on the general proposition that mad cow disease
is unlikely to enter the human food chain because it manifests in the brains and spinal cords of
cows. Martin, supra note 60.
64. BROUGHER & GREENE, supra note 63 (emphasis added) (quoting FOOD SAFETY
& INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1: RECALL OF MEAT AND
POULTRY PRODUCTS 2 (2013), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/77a99dc39784-4a1f-b694-ecf4eea455a6/8080.1.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/6Z4T-599D]).
65. Id. (quoting FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 64).
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Hallmark incident is the horrific reality that neither the USDA nor FSIS
even has the authority to mandate a recall of meat and poultry products.66
Only companies themselves can initiate recalls.67
One can only imagine what result might have occurred had footage of
Hallmark’s practice not been released.68 Indeed, the USDA is supposed
to monitor slaughterhouses for abuse.69 Slaughterhouses are supposed to
alert federal veterinarians when cows become unable to walk after passing
inspection.70 But what if neither happens, as in this case—or what if one
such scenario does occur—yet the company chooses not to recall its product?
Hopefully federal agencies would at least publicize the situation.71 But
what if the situation only fits Class II, as it did in Hallmark? Assuming
no one dies from the failure, what incentive remains to inform the public?
What if, on top of this harrowing scenario, undercover investigators
actually uncovered a problem, but they were gagged from reporting it?
Herein lies the dangers in ag-gag statutes. More broadly, producers might
engage in substandard practices that do not pose risks of acute illness or
death, but which no consumer would endorse knowing all of the facts.

66. Id. at 2. Despite the USDA not possessing the authority to recall meat, it can
still put pressure on a company to issue a recall by withdrawing its inspectors from a plant.
Martin, supra note 60.
67. BROUGHER & GREENE, supra note 63, at 2.
68. At the very least, the entirety of a substandard product could have reached the
public. Hallmark, “a leading supplier to the National School Lunch Program,” thus could
have caused harm to a child. Bill Marler, Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co to Shut
Down? In Wake of Massive Recall, MARLER BLOG (Feb. 23, 2008), https://www.marlerblog.com/
legal-cases/hallmarkwestland-meat-packing-co-to-shut-down-in-wake-of-massive-recall/
[https://perma.cc/ASA8-2SC6]. Although there were no serious health consequences
following Hallmark’s recall, had it not been brought to the public’s attention, Hallmark
might have continued the practice of slaughtering downer cows for consumption. See id.
Left unchecked, Hallmark’s risky practices inevitably might have led to more serious
consequences for American consumers. Instead, Hallmark was forced to shut down following
the recall. Meatpacker to Shut Down Permanently After Recall: Report, REUTERS (Feb. 24,
2008, 10:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hallmark-westland-meat-idUSN242056
20080224 [https://perma.cc/N7N9-THKQ].
69. Martin, supra note 60.
70. Id.
71. The USDA and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have
reported large meat recalls due to listeria and E. coli contamination. See, e.g., Brittany
Shoot, What’s in Your Kitchen? See if You Are Impacted by Recent Food Recalls for
Ground Beef, Curry Powder Recalled Due to Salmonella, Lead, FORTUNE (Oct. 29, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/10/29/cdc-fda-usda-meat-beef-salmonella-curry-powder-recall/
[https://perma.cc/8X9P-CZAC] (“A joint recall effort between the CDC and USDA is
pulling back up to 6.5 million pounds of beef . . . .”). The Hallmark recall was the largest
to date. U.S. News Library Staff, Top Six Meat Recalls in U.S. History, U.S. NEWS (Feb.
20, 2008, 3:03 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/02/20/top-sixmeat-recalls-in-us-history.
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B. Transparent Standards to Enable Consumer Choice
The stakes are not always so high. When egregious standards lead
to E. coli or listeria, consumers react severely and companies must address
those standards.72 Yet, even the savvy consumer remains ignorant without
the necessary information to make an informed choice. For example, the
FDA claims there is minimal difference when it comes to consumer health
between milk from cows treated with hormones and milk from cows not
treated with hormones.73 Regardless of whether this is correct, consumers
ought to be able to decide which type of milk they want to consume. The
law currently allows dairy producers to advertise a product as “rbST-free”
so long as they also disclose that “no significant difference has been shown”
between the two classes of milk.74 Meanwhile, producers of milk from
cows treated with hormones are not required to disclose that information.75
The notion that the government knows best or that more information will
confuse consumers is paternalistic at best. A consumer might learn that
rbST-treated cows experience more mastitis—which causes resistance to
antibiotics and leads to allergic reactions in people who consume the
milk76—and then decide to buy milk without rbST. Even more casually,

72. See Tyco Integrated Sec., Recall: The Food Industry’s Biggest Threat to Profitability,
FOOD SAFETY MAG. (Oct. 2012), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/signature-series/
recall-the-food-industrys-biggest-threat-to-profitability/ (“Today’s consumer cannot help
but be aware of food recalls [and in] a Harris Interactive poll, consumers indicated that
55% would switch brands temporarily following a recall, and 15% said they would never
purchase the recalled product and 20% would avoid purchasing any brand made by the
manufacturer of the product.”). “Pathogens like Listeria monoytogenes or Salmonella on
ready-to-eat products, or E. coli O157:H7 on raw beef products [warrant] Class I recalls.”
BROUGHER & GREENE, supra note 63; see, e.g., U.S. FOODS, FOOD INNOVATIONS – SALMONELLA
CLASS 1 RECALL (2015), https://www.usfoods.com/content/dam/usf/pdf/product_recalls/
Food%20Innovations%20FF.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7NT-JSQU] (highlighting Food
Innovations’ self-reported Salmonella Class I recall of Cheese Ravioli Pasta).
73. The FDA has found “that there is no measurable compositional difference between
the two” types of milk. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010).
74. Id. at 634. In its interim guide, the FDA approved the voluntary labeling of
milk products that had not been treated with rbST but did not require that companies using
the hormone disclose that fact. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk
Products from Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59
Fed. Reg. 6279, 6279–80 (Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Interim Guidance].
75. See Interim Guidance, supra note 74, at 6280.
76. See Robert Collier, Regulation of rbST in the U.S., 3 AGBIOFORUM 156, 160
(2000), http://agbioforum.org/v3n23/v3n23a14-collier.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XKM-94U5].
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consumers might realize that their skin reacts more severely to milk from
cows treated with rbst than to milk from untreated cows.77
Although the FDA does not acknowledge the significance of these
differing reactions, these types of decisions impact both consumer health
and company marketing. Perhaps dairy producers are not even aware that
a demand for an altered product exists. Producers may save money by
injecting their cows with hormones, but fully-informed consumers may pay
more for hormone-free milk.78 The root of the problem is a lack of information.
To insist that companies list all research pertaining to their product on
their labels, or even on their company websites, would likely overburden
them. However, when companies omit basic information concerning content,
practice, and standards, the consumer remains uninformed, save only
independent diligence.
Because only policymakers and corporations can currently decide what
aspect of products, production, and processes are relevant to disclose, consumers
miss out on making informed decisions.79 Under the commercial-speech
framework, “misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely” where
speech “is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that
a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.”80
Where speech is only potentially misleading, however, “the preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.”81 As such, “transparency” is
the appropriate remedial approach to allow consumers to decide what is
relevant to them making informed decisions.82 Only when more information
is disclosed may consumers determine what information they find relevant.
A court’s definition of “misleading advertising” determines how liberally
the commercial-speech framework applies. In 2008, in response to Ohio
governor Ted Strickland’s executive order directing Robert Boggs, the
77. See id.
78. Moreover, the First Amendment does not protect advertising that contains
“misleading” information that deceives consumers. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202–03
(1982). Thus, “misleading” information can be prohibited from advertising. Id.
79. See generally Jonathan H. Alder, Compelled Commercial Speech & The Consumer
“Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421 (2016).
80. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202. Where commercial speech concerns lawful activity
and is not misleading, First Amendment protection only yields to the proposed regulation
if the government “interest to be served by the restriction on commercial speech is
substantial [and] not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980).
81. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374
(1977)); see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 374, 384 (striking down a ban on price advertising for
“routine legal services” in part because “it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the
ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed
to reach an informed decision”).
82. Nicole E. Negowetti, Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparency and the
Resurgence of Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1345, 1374 (2015).
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Ohio Director of Agriculture (ODA), to “define what constitutes false and
misleading labels on milk and milk products,” Boggs issued a rule that
categorized claims of hormone-free or rbST-free milk as “misleading.”83
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Boggs’s “prophylactic ban” on “rbSTfree” labeling was unconstitutional.84 It found that Boggs’s interest in
protecting consumers from a potentially misleading label that defines a
product as “rbST-free” was unwarranted given that composition content
could be presented in a way that is not deceptive.85 Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit maintained that because advertising the exclusion of hormone
content qualified as potentially misleading, the rule’s language requiring
a disclaimer of “no significant difference” was valid.86
Seemingly, informing consumers of a product’s content is straightforward,
rather than misleading. Yet, the district court in Boggs found that composition
claims were inherently misleading because they contrasted with the FDA’s
finding that there was minimal compositional difference between milk
from treated and untreated cows.87 Beside the glaring problem that the
FDA decides whether a producer can include factual content information
on the label of its product, it can apparently do so with little qualification
as to what “compositional difference” means.88 Fortunately, the Sixth
Circuit found flaws in both the FDA’s and district court’s analyses.89
First, the Sixth Circuit upheld the FDA’s original labeling guidance,90
which prevented Boggs from imposing a prophylactic ban on labels that

83. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 091:11-8-01 (2008) (repealed 2012)).
84. Id. at 639–40 (“[The] prophylactic ban of composition claims such as ‘rbST
free’ is more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interest in preventing consumer
deception.”).
85. Id. at 639 (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; Interim Guidance, supra note 74; see supra Part II.
89. See Boggs, 622 F.3d at 636–37. The Sixth Circuit found that “a compositional
difference does exist between milk from untreated cows and conventional milk.” Id. at
636 (emphasis added). Relying on its amici parties, it found that rbST “has been shown
to elevate the levels of insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF–1), a naturally-occurring hormone
that in high levels is linked to several types of cancers, among other things”; that it induces
an “unnatural period of milk production during a cow’s ‘negative energy phase,’ [producing
milk] considered to be low quality”; and “that milk from treated cows contains higher somatic
cell counts, which makes the milk turn sour more quickly.” Id. at 636–37.
90. See Interim Guidance, supra note 74.
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highlight an absence of rbST.91 Despite this victory, it likewise relied
upon the FDA’s original language92 regarding compositional difference as
“weak evidence of deception” sufficient to warrant approval of Boggs’s
disclosure requirement.93 Yet, by acknowledging that there was in fact a
compositional difference between milk from treated and untreated
cows94—a distinction that the FDA has never acknowledged95—the Sixth
Circuit made significant progress toward transparency.
Recently, milk producers have pushed the envelope even further in
attempts to gain a marketplace advantage. Dairy farmers have alleged that
calling plant-based products yogurt, milk, or cheese is misleading to
consumers because it implies nondairy milk is “nutritionally similar” to
cow’s milk.96 Although such attempts might be admirable in the name of
business—after all, the FDA defines milk as an animal’s “lacteal
secretion”97—denying nondairy products the label milk at this point would
only serve to confuse consumers further. They know what they are buying.98
91. Boggs, 622 F.3d at 639. The Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio rule was “more
extensive than necessary to serve the [State’s] interest” in preventing consumer deception.
Id.
92. See Interim Guidance, supra note 74.
93. Boggs, 622 F.3d at 642. The language of the ODA rule deemed a dairy product
misbranded if it contained a false or misleading statement. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 091:118-01 (2008) (repealed 2012). It also stated that a label claiming that a milk product was
not supplemented with rbST was misleading unless it also disclosed that “[t]he FDA has
determined that no significant difference has been shown between milk derived from
rbST-supplemented and non-rbST-supplemented cows.” Id.
94. Boggs, 622 F.3d at 636.
95. The FDA’s position on rbST has largely remained stagnant since rbST’s
introduction in 1993. See Report on the FDA’s Review of the Safety of Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin, FDA (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Safety
Health/ProductSafetyInformation/ucm130321.htm [https://perma.cc/C93Q-QGCM]. The
FDA still relies upon its 1993 audit of all studies used in determining the human food
safety of rbST. See id. In 1993, the FDA denied the results of Health Canada’s rat study
that concluded Posilac caused adverse human health effects, succinctly stating that
“Canadian reviewers did not interpret the results correctly.” Id. Additionally, the FDA claims
that “there are no new scientific concerns regarding the safety of milk from cows treated
with rbGH,” and that “bGH [natural bovine growth hormone] and rbGH are biologically
indistinguishable.” Id.
96. Anahad O’Connor, Got Almond Milk? Dairy Farms Protest Milk Label on Nondairy
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2l8g99d [https://perma.cc/M8F9-4UT3].
97. Teaganne Finn, FDA Wants to Address Udder Confusion on Milk Labeling
Rules, BLOOMBERG GOV’T (July 18, 2018), https://about.bgov.com/blog/fda-wants-udderconfusion-on-milk-labeling/ [https://perma.cc/XU9B-53ZE].
98. Indeed, if the FDA started enforcing strict definitions of dairy-related terms,
other nondairy products with dairy names would be affected. “Will milk of magnesia, cocoa
butter, cream of wheat and peanut butter have to change their names as well?” Id. The
Plant Based Foods Association, along with leading advocates and organizations representing
manufacturers of plant-based foods—including Blue Diamond and Campbell Soup
Company—led the coalition in November 2017 opposing this possibility and the Dairy
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Dairy companies claim their interest lies in minimizing confusion: ensuring
that customers actually get milk.99 This may have been a valid argument
a decade ago, but consumers have consciously been purchasing rice, nut,
coconut, soy, and hemp milks for too long now. At this point, changing
labeling standards under the guise of arbitrary principle insults consumers,
because a “reasonable consumer . . . would not assume that two distinct
products have the same nutritional content; if the consumer cared about
the nutritional content, she would consult the label.”100 Furthermore,
when two indistinct products—say hormone-treated and untreated cow’s
milk—are not plainly or even equally labeled, a reasonable consumer
would assume the products have the same nutritional content.101 Milk
from treated and untreated cows plainly does not have the same nutritional
content, and the harm by concealing this information from consumers is
Pride Act. MICHELE SIMON, PLANT BASED FOODS ASS’N, PLANT BASED COALITION LOBBIES
CONGRESS TO OPPOSE DAIRY PRIDE ACT 1 (2017), http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/
14866415.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3SE-VFHZ].
99. O’Connor, supra note 96.
100. Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-cv-01333-VC, 2015 WL 9121232, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015). Federal District Court Judge Vince Chhabria struck down the
DAIRY PRIDE bill in California. Editorial Board, Sour Milk from the Dairy Industry,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-milk-almond-soy-dairy-fda-edit-0410-md-20170407-story.html [https://perma.cc/
MU6Y-69CK?type=image].
101. A University of Wisconsin survey found that “less than 12 percent [of
consumers] believed food-related application of rbGH is a good or excellent idea, and 74
percent were moderately or very concerned about rbGH-related health risks that may be
found in the future.” Deana Grobe, New National Survey Finds Consumer Concern over
Milk Hormones, OR. ST. U. (Aug. 28, 2009), http://today.oregonstate.edu/archives/1996/
jan/new-national-survey-finds-consumer-concern-over-milk-hormones [https://perma.cc/
E7ZK-BSUK]. Yet, “64 percent . . . knew something about [rbGH] [and approximately]
94 percent . . . said they approved of labels to differentiate milk from treated and untreated
sources.” Id. Despite these numbers, in 2016, organic food, which includes hormone-free
milk, accounted for a mere 5.3 percent of total food sales in the U.S. Maggie McNeal,
Robust Organic Sector Stays on Upward Climb, Posts New Records in U.S. Sales,
ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N (May 27, 2017), https://www.ota.com/news/press-releases/19681
[https://perma.cc/CE39-9F3G]. If only 12% of consumers think rbGH in their milk is a
good idea, this number should be much higher, even if not everyone drinks milk and even
if milk accounts for a small percentage of food sales, because if 64% of people know
something about rbGH, then logically, the same percentage of people know about hormones in
general. See Grobe, supra. Furthermore, if 94% of people approve of labels that differentiate
milk from treated and untreated sources, they likewise likely approve of labels that differentiate
hormones in other animal products. See id. Moreover, the fact that consumers only buy
5% organic points to the strong possibility that they think there is no difference. See McNeal,
supra. Further, they may think there is no difference because they rely on inadequate labels.
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not only that they must rely upon the government’s standard of health but
also the strong chance of misinformation.102 Offering additional data to
complement existing understanding is key.
Milk from cows treated with rbST is but one example of how the
exclusion of information can have a range of effects on consumer health.
In addition to health-related matters, research indicates that consumers
also care about animal and employee welfare when properly exposed.103
The same deficiencies present in health-related disclosure laws exist in the
legislation governing disclosure of animal and employee conditions: they are
inconsistent, incomplete, and generic. Part IV will discuss existing food safety
regulations and how they fall short.
IV. EXISTING FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS
A. Existing Regulations: The Adequacy Argument
Proponents of less agricultural regulation maintain that current standards
are adequate.104 Two main laws govern food labeling: the FD&C Act105
and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA).106 The FD&C Act regulates
national uniform nutrition labeling, misbranded food, and disclosure.107
The relevant sections prescribe very basic standards. For example, one
must label the fruit known as cantaloupe, as cantaloupe.108 Under the FPLA,
“[p]ackages and their labels should enable consumers to obtain accurate
102. See infra Section IV.B.1.
103. See Anna Starostinetskaya, Consumers’ Animal Welfare Concerns Hit “Critical
Mass,” V EG N EWS (Apr. 29, 2017), https://vegnews.com/2017/4/consumers-animalwelfare-concerns-hit-critical-mass [https://perma.cc/D9JX-BLEX] (“[D]ue in large part to
undercover investigations at factory farms, consumers continue to be increasingly concerned
with animal welfare within the food industry. . . .”). In the absence of worker strikes and
nonprofit movements, awareness of worker conditions is less commonplace. See Stephen
Lurie, You Care About Where Your Food Comes from. Shouldn’t You Care About Who
Grew and Picked It?, VOX (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/4/2/
8203301/food-movement-labor. Although many labels attest to the nutrition and ethics of
products, a standalone certification verifying good labor practices currently does not exist.
Id. Presumably, this information should be more readily available to consumers, or
alternatively, employees should be more empowered within the workplace. See discussion
infra Part VI.
104. Generally, proponents consist of state agricultural departments and farmers
with traditional products. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648–
49 (6th Cir. 2010).
105. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2018).
106. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1461 (2018).
107. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399.
108. See id. at § 343 (“A food shall be deemed to be misbranded—(a) . . . If (1) its
labeling is false or misleading in any particular, or (2) . . . its advertising is false or
misleading in a material respect [or (b) if] it is offered for sale under the name of another
food.”).
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information” because “[i]nformed consumers are essential to the fair and
efficient functioning of a free market economy.”109 In furtherance of those
goals, the FPLA requires commodity labels include the commodity name;
“the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor”;
and the “net quantity of contents.”110 The FPLA further regulates label
styling, “serving” disclosures, and the use of supplemental statements.111
Nonetheless, the labeling requirements still afford state agencies generous
room to enact their own labeling regulations.112
Although federal regulations on food labeling are minimal, new forms
of regulations have emerged in response to the growing agricultural
industry. Ecolabels, for example, are one such form of functional safety
regulation.113 Ecolabels visually communicate “environmentally preferable
products, services or companies that are based on [third-party] standards.”114
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) makes
recommendations of ecolabels for federal purchasing,115 serving as
“information-based government intervention.”116 One such ecolabel is the
“USDA Organic” label.117

109. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to
assist consumers and manufacturers in reaching these goals in the marketing of consumer
goods.”).
110. Id. § 1453.
111. Id.
112. See id. § 1458.
113. See Megan S. Houston, Note, Ecolabel Programs and Green Consumerism:
Preserving a Hybrid Approach to Environmental Regulation, 7 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 225, 226 (2012).
114. Id. (citation omitted). For example, the “Fair Trade Certified” ecolabel certifies
that “products are sourced from producers that engage in sustainable practices, have safe
working conditions, and earn fair and stable prices.” Anne Field, Certifications: A Closer
Look at 12 Ecolabels and Certifications, B CHANGE (Oct. 31, 2016), https://bthechange.com/
certifications-a-closer-look-at-12-ecolabels-and-certifications-87f63eadb958 [https://perma.cc/
EV5M-XDLU]. The nonprofit organization Fair Trade USA certifies compliant organizations.
Id. In contrast, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which provides the
Energy Star certification and ecolabel, utilizes independent third-party certifiers who determine
compliance. Id.
115. Recommendations of Specifications, Standards, and Ecolabels for Federal
Purchasing, EPA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/greenerproducts/recommendationsspecifications-standards-and-ecolabels-federal-purchasing [https://perma.cc/Q4SN-HW3Q].
116. Houston, supra note 113.
117. Id. at 238–39.
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The National Organic Program (NOP), a federal regulatory agency overseen
by the USDA, regulates the use of the term “organic” on food labels.118
The NOP allows states to enact their own organic certification if they
conform with the NOP’s standards.119 These standards include a National
List of substances that may not be certified organic.120 Many consumers
now rely upon the organic label in making healthy choices.121 Evidently,
when given more information, consumers take pause before checking out.
B. Shortcomings of Existing Regulations
1. Potential for Appointment of Inadequate Leaders
Nevertheless, advocates of the less is more mantra argue that more
information can also be misleading.122 Proponents against special labeling
for the use of rbST, for example, claim that because no significant difference
exists between milk from rbST-treated and untreated cows, both are equally
safe and healthy for human consumption.123 Notwithstanding the fact that

118. 7 U.S.C. § 6503 (2018). The Secretary of Agriculture consults with the
“National Organic Standards Board,” which is comprised of fifteen members—appointed
by nomination—knowledgeable in organic farming and handling, environmental protection,
science, and public interest. Id. § 6518.
119. Id. § 6503(b).
120. Id. § 6517.
121. See generally Kristen Leigh Painter, Americans Are Eating More Organic Food
Than Ever, Survey Finds, STAR TRIB. (May 24, 2017, 11:27 PM), http://www.startribune.com/
americans-are-eating-more-organic-food-than-ever-survey-finds/424061513/ [https://perma.cc/
9EJL-24GB].
122. See, e.g., Josh Dhyani, Science-Based Food Labels: Improving Regulations &
Preventing Consumer Deception Through Limited Disclosure, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
1, 34 (2016) (citation omitted); Beth Hoffman, ‘Organic’ One of The Most Confusing
Labels, Report Says, FORBES (Jul 17, 2013, 11:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bethhoffman/2013/07/17/organic-causes-confusion/#667e6c013159 [https://perma.cc/D2NR5NA4].
123. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 382–83 (7th Cir. 2018).
After the FDA approved rbST in 1993, it came out with interim guidance regarding rbST
labeling. See Interim Guidance, supra note 74. Because the FDA concluded that there
was “[n]o significant difference . . . between milk derived from rbST-treated and nonrbST-treated cows,” the FDA did not require special labeling for milk from treated cows.
Id. Seemingly, the FDA offered guidance because prior to February 3, 1994, there existed
a congressional moratorium on the commercial sale of rbST. See id. The worry was—
and the guidance sought to prevent—that false or misleading claims regarding rbST would be
made. Id. Eli Lilly, who purchased Monsanto’s rbST hormone, Posilac, filed suit against Arla
Foods in 2017 for making false or misleading claims about rbST. See Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d
at 379; Eli Lilly Buys Troubled Monsanto Dairy Product, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Aug.
20, 2008), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/eli-lilly-buys-troubled-monsantodairy-product [https://perma.cc/Z5LC-N3PJ]. The trial court granted Eli Lilly’s request
to enjoin Arla from running its “Live Unprocessed” advertisements, ruling that the ads
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some consumers may still choose to purchase rbST-ridden milk, it is troubling
that a court may essentially enable a producer to censor a product because
it has determined an ingredient has no effect.124 Indeed, the fact that
Europe and Canada have prohibited rbST since 1994 because of concerns
of food safety, cow health, and impact on small farms—and have maintained
the moratorium in response to evidence that rbST causes cancer—implies
there is a significant difference between milk from treated and untreated
cows.125 By regulating rbST labeling, the government aims to maintain
neutral consumer reception of rbST so as not to mislead consumers.126 This
regulation protects big companies but leaves consumers vulnerable.
Ideally, federal agencies such as the NOP and FDA would consist of
objective, well-intentioned individuals. Yet, the President of the United
States holds wide discretion in making federal agency appointments, many
of which do not require Senate approval.127 Often, the president may appoint
based on political favors rather than qualification.128 The NOP must consist
were “likely to mislead consumers about the wholesomeness of products made from milk
supplied by rbST-treated cows.” Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 383.
124. See generally Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d 375; Interim Guidance, supra note 74.
125. See Anna Hunt, American Milk Banned in Europe Because It Does No Body
Good, WAKING TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.wakingtimes.com/2013/01/18/americanmilk-banned-in-europe-because-it-does-no-body-good/ [https://perma.cc/8PBU-SXQL].
“[T]he Codex Alimentarius Commission, the U.N. Food Safety Agency representing 101
nations worldwide, has banned rbST” in the 101 nations it represents. Id. The moratorium
has been in place since 1990. Collier, supra note 76, at 158–59.
126. The FDA has maintained that because “the claim ‘rbST free’ ‘may imply a
compositional difference’ between the two types of milk,” such a claim is misleading
without a disclaimer indicating there is no actual difference. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Interim Guidance, supra note 74).
Although the court in Boggs ultimately upheld the FDA’s interim guidance requiring the
disclaimer, the court did so while acknowledging that the claim “rbST free” is not
misleading in every context and pointing out that “the FDA cited no evidence or studies
in the Guidance to support its concerns regarding consumer confusion.” Id.
127. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
128. “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
Id. Presidential appointments outside of Cabinet secretaries and supreme court justices do
not require Senate approval. Id. Thus, the president has complete discretion in appointing
Heads of Departments. Id.; see also Robert Longley, Presidential Appointments: No Senate
Required, THOUGHTCO. (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/presidential-appointmentsno-senate-required-3322124 [https://perma.cc/2EX8-H34M]; Zack Piaker, Help Wanted:
4,000 Presidential Appointees, CTR. FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://presidentialtransition.org/blog/posts/160316_help-wanted-4000-appointees.php [https://
perma.cc/5S7Q-GZXX]. However, in part due to the sole reference to “Heads of Departments”
existing in the Appointment Clause, scholars continue to debate over whether the framers
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of a number of organic farmers, environmental conservationists, and other
individuals representing public or consumer interest groups.129 Despite
the requirement that appointees to the NOP must meet a higher appointment
standard than most presidential appointments without Senate confirmation
(PAs), the bar is still relatively low.130 Indeed, one of the few rules outlined
in agency appointment restricts employment of relatives, but even then
there are loopholes.131 Presidents may appoint relatives if they serve without
pay, temporarily, or are “preference eligible.”132 Therefore, existing measures
may only feign accountability, leaving an abundance of discretion available
in appointing the most crucial positions in agricultural federal agencies.

intended a distinction between this phrase and “principal officers”—the otherwise consistentlyused phrase throughout the Constitution. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1994). That is, given the
express language of the Opinions Clause of “executive” departments, some scholars argue
the “Heads of Departments” reference within the Appointments Clause ought to have
likewise specified executive “Heads of Departments.” See id. Failure to do so, the
argument goes, implies a distinction. Id. Scholars Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna
Prakash retort that the framers intended no distinction between department heads and
principal officers and that the distinct language of the Appointments Clause was used to
emphasize “a means of relieving Congress and the President of the duty of nominating and
confirming every officer of the federal government.” Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna
B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 630 (1994).
The president’s power to appoint officers without Senate approval is nonetheless hotly
contested and raises speculation as to whether the Senate should approve certain appointments
that are not intrinsically executive. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of
Adjudication Within the Executive Branch, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1093–94 (2015).
This is an especially relevant issue considering the drastic transformation of the appointment
procedure in the last few decades. That is, 163 of the total 321 presidentially appointed positions
governmentwide that do not require Senate confirmation were created through President
Obama’s Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act in 2012. Longley,
supra.
129. The NOP
Board shall be composed of 15 members, of which—(1) four shall . . . operate
an organic farming operation; (2) two shall . . . own or operate an organic handling
operation; (3) one shall . . . own[] or operate[] a retail establishment with significant
trade in organic products; (4) three shall . . . [have] expertise in areas of environmental
protection and resource conservation; (5) three shall . . . represent public interest
or consumer interest groups; (6) one shall . . . [have] expertise in the fields of
toxicology, ecology, or biochemistry; (7) and one shall be . . . a certifying agent as
identified under . . . this title.
7 U.S.C. § 6518(b) (2018).
130. See Longley, supra note 128.
131. See 5 U.S.C. § 3110(b), (d) (2018).
132. Id. at § 3110(e).
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2. Agricultural Boards May Not Serve Consumers’ Best Interests
Although many agencies under the USDA prescribe a balance of qualified
individuals, no rule exists excluding individuals from serving who have
conflicts of interest. For example, Monsanto developed rbST under the
name Posilac in the early nineties, finding that when injected into cows,
the hormone increased milk production by up to sixteen percent.133 Posilac
gained FDA approval in 1993134 and in 1994, the United States lifted its
moratorium on the previously banned product.135 In 2008, Monsanto sold
Posilac to Eli Lilly,136 who has fought the rbST-free label ever since.137
Eli Lilly has argued that absence labels can be misleading and imply that
milk from cows treated with rbST is inferior.138 Incidentally, courts have
reasoned similarly, maintaining that “rbST-free” producers may not make
claims that there is any difference between the two types of milk.139
Interestingly, Monsanto introduced a product to the United States that
was banned in many countries worldwide and Eli Lilly has since successfully
kept it on the market.140 More interesting is Monsanto’s connection to
Washington.141 Notably, former Monsanto attorney and current Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas has not recused himself in cases directly
involving Monsanto and its interests.142 Even United Nations representatives

133. I.R. Dohoo et al., A Meta-Analysis Review of the Effects of Recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin, 67 CAN. J. VET. RES. 252, 253, 257 (2003). The increase is closer to 25%
today. Grobe, supra note 101.
134. Dohoo et al., supra note 133, at 253.
135. Interim Guidance, supra note 74, at 1280.
136. Eli Lilly Buys Troubled Monsanto Dairy Product, supra note 123.
137. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., 393 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2018).
138. Id.
139. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010).
140. RbST has been banned by the European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Israel. Edward Group, 8 Shocking Facts About Bovine Growth Hormone,
GLOBAL HEALING CTR., https://www.globalhealingcenter.com/natural-health/8-shockingfacts-bovine-growth-hormone/ [https://perma.cc/M9LY-LKWF].
141. See Janie Boschma, Monsanto: Big Guy on the Block When It Comes to Friends
in Washington, OPENSECRETS (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/02/
monsanto/ [https://perma.cc/XE55-CN49].
142. See id. In 2013, Justice Thomas did not recuse himself from hearing Bowman
v. Monsanto Co., which addressed Monsanto’s herbicide-resistant seed patents. Id.; see
also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013). Similarly, in 2001, he authored the
opinion in a case not involving Monsanto but holding that new, developed plant breeds
are patentable. See generally J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124 (2001). Both instances posed clear conflicts of interest. Boschma, supra note 141.
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have Monsanto ties.143 Additionally, Monsanto engages in frequent lobbying,
contributes generously to political action committees, and monetarily
fights legislation much to its success.144
Reliance on government agencies to protect consumers is inadequate.
Ideally, companies seeking to disclose more in the name of consumer trust
should receive a helping hand to combat behemoths of the industry that
are well connected to Washington and able to throw millions of dollars at
any given obstacle.145 Congruently, reliance on the USDA and Department
of Human Health Services (HHS) to develop dietary guidelines may be
misplaced. The agencies base the final guidelines, at least in part, on a report
from the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, which is made up of
“experts in the fields of health and nutrition.”146 “The Advisory Committee
bases its recommendations on thousands of pages of published research,
and the report is open to public comment.”147 Yet, the current guidelines
deviate substantially from the committee’s recommendations.148 The
USDA contends deviations “reflect the latest research and science, as well
as [their] current understanding of the connections between diet and health.”149
Unfortunately, because of the “regulatory revolving door” present at the
USDA, executing objective standards is difficult.150 Until the USDA
143. See Charles Platiau, Conflict of Interest? Members of UN Panel on Glyphosate
Have Monsanto Ties, RT (May 18, 2016, 8:09 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/343485-unwho-glyphosate-cancer-risks/ [https://perma.cc/HS25-DXMR].
144. See Boschma, supra note 141; Monsanto Company Citizenship Fund AKA Monsanto
Citizenship Fund, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00042069/
?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/9H5C-S39L].
145. In 2012, for example, Monsanto spent millions of dollars successfully opposing
California’s Proposition 37, which would have mandated the disclosure of genetically
modified crops on food labels. See Amy Westervelt, Monsanto, DuPont Spending Millions to
Oppose California’s GMO Labeling Law, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 10:00 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/amywestervelt/2012/08/22/monsanto-dupont-spending-millionsto-oppose-californias-gmo-labeling-law/#4f9a2222605b [https://perma.cc/48SC-PTMZ].
146. Markham Heid, Experts Say Lobbying Skewed the U.S. Dietary Guidelines,
TIME (Jan. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4130043/lobbying-politics-dietary-guidelines/ [https://
perma.cc/4GB3-CNNC]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 2015−2020 (8th ed. 2015),
https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_Guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3UU-NKXD].
147. Heid, supra note 146; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 146, at vii.
148. Heid, supra note 146 (“[L]eading nutrition experts . . . say the guidelines are
influenced too much by food manufacturers, food producers, and special interest groups.”).
149. Id.
150. Josh Sager, Monsanto Controls Both the White House and the US Congress,
GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.globalresearch.ca/monsanto-controls-both-thewhite-house-and-the-us-congress/5336422 [https://perma.cc/A3WY-LLS4]. Monsanto
exemplifies a corporation that has infiltrated regulatory agencies through its corporate
actors moving in and out of each position to gain corporate advantages. See id. The deputy
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alleviates one of its functions, managing food production or crafting nutrition
policy,151 consumers risk receiving mixed messages about the facts concerning
their food.
3. Other Shortcomings
Apart from the skeptical relationships between policymakers and
corporations, existing standards often lack specificity otherwise helpful to
consumers. For example, one might argue that the organic label is more
misleading than the rbST-free label, because organic automatically signifies a
readily understood attribute, which many consumers might believe negates
any other dubious attributes of the product.152 Ideally, any label would be
“well understood by consumers and reflect their preferences.”153 To pass
as adequate—avoiding consumer deception and mistrust—disclosure
should be verified and substantiated.154
Until lawmakers redefine the relationship between what is misleading
and what counts as little difference, corporations seeking to empower
consumers will be prohibited from sharing the whole story with them.
Likewise, corporations seeking to conceal information will be enabled to
do so, forcing consumers to rely upon their own diligence for information.
director of the FDA under Bush Sr., the director of the USDA under Obama, and the
deputy commissioner of the FDA under Obama are only a few examples of Monsanto
executives who have also worked for the federal government. See id.; Jared Diamond,
Agency Guarding U.S. Food Supply Has Close Ties to Beef Industry, IATP (Jan. 28, 2004),
https://www.iatp.org/news/agency-guarding-us-food-supply-has-close-ties-to-beef-industry
[https://perma.cc/5VXD-8DEQ] (noting that USDA deputy undersecretary Charles Lambert
formerly worked for the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association).
151. Heid, supra note 146 (“Placing the guidelines solely in the hands of the Department
of Health and Human Services would be a step in the right direction . . . .”).
152. For example, the “organic label does not guarantee that a product is free from
pesticides or chemicals, nor does it certify the overall agricultural land use process.”
Houston, supra note 113, at 226, 239–41 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Michelle T.
Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food Regulations, 13
N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 379, 384–85 (2005); then citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM 2–3 (2010); and then
citing Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling; Organic, Carbon Footprint,
and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 15 (2011)).
153. Id. at 226 (quoting David Conner & Ralph Christy, The Organic Label: How to
Reconcile Its Meaning with Consumer Preferences, 35 J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION RES. 40, 40
(2004)).
154. Id. (citing Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of
the Scientific Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal
Certification Mark Program, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 (1994)).
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To trigger consumer enlightenment and gain consumer trust, the USDA
should offer tailored benefit corporation status to corporations willing to
go the extra mile to disclose contents and practice transparency.
V. UNDERSTANDING BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
A. What is a Benefit Corporation?
A benefit corporation has the benefit of pursuing “socially-minded
purposes” as one of its core objectives without the threat of legal backlash.155
Ordinarily, a for-profit corporation has a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder profits, and shareholders may sue if the corporation fails to
pursue that objective.156 In benefit corporations, shareholders generally
may “hold directors accountable for failure to create material positive

155. Benefit Corporations: What Are the Advantages, Disadvantages, and Impact on
Not-for-Profit Organizations?, COHNREZNICK (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.cohnreznick.com/
insights-and-events/insights/benefit-corporations-what-are-advantages-disadvantages-andimpact-not-profit-organizations [https://perma.cc/6WYN-S9KN].
156. Id; see LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-831 (2018); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (“This
rule applies when one or more shareholders . . . bring a derivative action to enforce a right
that the corporation . . . may properly assert but has failed to enforce.”). But see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2017) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain [a]
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or
its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as director, provided
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director (i) [f]or any breach
of the directors duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholder [or] (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law . . . .”); Jacob E. Hasler, Note, Contracting for Good: How Benefit
Corporations Empower Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1292 (2014) (“Though the ‘best interests of the corporation’ could be synonymous with
maximizing shareholder value, it is by no means the only interpretation of the statutes.”
(quoting Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible”
Shareholder, 10 Stan. J.L., Bus. & Fin. 31, 33–34 (2005)). The court in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. held that a “a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. [As such,] [t]he powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.” Id. (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919)). Despite
this holding, “Dodge has been dismissed by commentators as ‘a mistake,’ applicable only
in the context of minority shareholder oppression, and largely irrelevant since it is nearly
one hundred years old.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Lynn A. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166, 176 (2008); and
then citing D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278,
323 (1998)).
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impact on society.”157 Presently, benefit corporations do not receive preferred
tax treatment and are authorized by state statutes.158
Benefit corporations came to fruition in 2010,159 shortly after the founding
of the nonprofit organization, B Lab, created in 2006.160 B Lab sought to
utilize business to solve social problems, aiming to address “the existence
of shareholder primacy which makes it difficult for corporations to take
employee, community, and environmental interests into consideration when
making decisions.”161 Ultimately, B Lab began certifying companies like
Etsy and Patagonia as “Certified B Corporations” by evaluating their
societal impact.162 B Lab’s lobbying efforts directly led to the emergence
of benefit corporation legislation in several states.163
For example, California passed benefit corporation legislation in 2012.164
The board of directors of a benefit corporation in California must consider
the impact of its actions upon its shareholders and employees, the interests
of its customers as beneficiaries of the public benefit purpose, and “[t]he
local and global environment.”165 Directors may escape liability if the

157. See, e.g., B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation
Legislation, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [https://perma.cc/
UE4V-5FJ7]. Although the Maryland statute enables directors to pursue goals outside of
making profits, the statute’s language does not require that directors must do so. See MD.
CODE ANN., Corporations and Associations § 5-6C-07 (West 2018). In fact, if a benefit
corporation director acts in good faith, he is immune from liability for not fulfilling benefit
corporation goals. Id. § 2-405.1.
158. Mystica M. Alexander, Benefit Corporations—The Latest Development in the
Evolution of Social Enterprise: Are They Worthy of a Taxpayer Subsidy?, 38 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 219, 222 (2014).
159. Id.
160. Amaan A. Shaikh, Comment, The Post-Concepcion Contract Landscape: The
Role Socially Conscious Business Can Play, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 223, 242–43 (2017).
161. Id. at 243 (quoting Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation:
An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62
EMORY L.J. 999, 1011 (2013)).
162. Id. at 243, 255–56 (quoting J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers
and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485. 488–89 (2012));
see also James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, NEW YORKER, Aug. 4, 2014, at 23,
23.
163. Shaikh, supra note 160, at 243 (citing Murray, supra note 162, at 489). With
every benefit corporation statute passed, more states, and thus more benefit corporations, would
likely require a third-party assessment, which is B Lab’s specialty. See Alcorn, supra note
23.
164. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620 (2018).
165. Id. § 14620(b)(1)–(5).
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benefit corporation incorporates as such, although any “provision may not
eliminate or limit the liability of directors . . . for acts or omissions that
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing and culpable violation of
law,” including several stipulations.166 California corporate law affords
directors similar flexibility.167 The main distinction between benefit
corporations and ordinary for-profits is that the former have the apparent
luxury of multiplying their goals.168
For example, Kickstarter, the self-proclaimed “world’s largest funding
platform for creative projects,”169 reincorporated as a benefit corporation
in 2015 through a unanimous vote by its shareholders.170 Kickstarter’s
charter outlines its “commitment to arts and culture,” its plan to make
decisions “swayed by profit motives,” and its vow “to donate 5% of annual
post-tax profits to arts education and organizations fighting inequality.”171
Such a mission complies with the intention of the benefit corporation
framework: providing social good.172 Additionally, Kickstarter releases
an annual assessment reflecting on its success in advancing its mission.173
Kickstarter’s provision of creative project resources exemplifies social good
worthy of special corporate treatment.174 Therefore, because Kickstarter
provides a benefit to society, the law does not require it answer to the same
corporate standard of maximizing shareholder profits to which regular
for-profit corporations must adhere.175

166. Id. § 204(a)(10).
167. See id. § 304. The board of a corporation must answer to its shareholders for
all prescribed shareholder actions or else be subject to suit. Id. Outside shareholder concerns,
a board has full discretion of all business affairs. See id. § 300(a).
168. Benefit Corporations, supra note 155.
169. Jason Furie, Become an Active Member of the Kickstarter Community, BACKERKIT
(May 3, 2018), https://www.backerkit.com/blog/kickstarter-community [https://perma.cc/
QH22-BFZT].
170. Yancey Strickler et al., Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefitcorporation [https://perma.cc/DFH8-H2AH].
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. In Kickstarter’s case, reincorporating as a benefit corporation was an effortless
means for gaining recognition without changing business values. See GEORGE SERAFEIM
ET AL., KKS ADVISORS, B CORPS & BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR COMPANIES AND INVESTORS 6 (2017), https://www.kksadvisors.com/s/B-Corps-BenefitCorporations.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A3E-FFUJ].
175. See Benefit Corporations, supra note 155.
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B. Criticisms of Benefit Corporations
Benefit corporation legislation supports the discretion of corporations
with goals outside of making profits. Without such legislation, any corporation
could limit liability as desired with the appropriate contract.176 The rationale
behind benefit corporation legislation, then, was to establish a class of
corporations predetermined as lawful, so there would be less uproar when
those corporations were not complying with traditional fiduciary duties.177
Consequently, with such a superfluous rationale, some deemed the legislation
unnecessary.
The main criticism of benefit corporations is that their alleged benefit—
the ability to pursue objectives outside of making profits—is one similarly
shared by ordinary for-profit corporations.178 Professor Lynn Stout of
Cornell Law School concluded that “maximizing shareholder value is not
a managerial obligation, it is a managerial choice.” 179 Critics argue
corporations share the alleged leniency afforded to benefit corporations
with regard to meeting business goals.180 Furthermore, despite the presumptive
distinction of benefit corporations being twofold—(1) directors cannot be
sued for abandoning profit maximization goals, and (2) directors can be
sued for abandoning altruistic policies—the actual language of many
statutes is not so finite, leaving critics wondering if there is actually
any difference.181 Indeed the language of California’s benefit corporation
legislation clearly states that “[a] director shall not be liable for monetary
damages . . . for any failure of the benefit corporation to create a general
or specific public benefit.”182 Moreover, the traditional notion that regular

176. See Dana Brackman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 595 (2011).
177. Id. at 596 (“Those purchasing shares in the benefit corporation . . . are thus placed
on notice of the special nature of the corporation . . . .”).
178. See Noam Noked, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful
Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmfuldichotomy/ [https://perma.cc/RT7E-ZUU6].
179. Id. (quoting LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 32 (2012)).
180. See id.
181. Surowiecki, supra note 162, at 23; see Noked, supra note 178.
182. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(f) (2018) (emphasis added).
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corporate directors must pursue profit maximization at all costs is not so
stringent.183
Others argue that benefit corporations inadequately prove social mission
compliance.184 Initially glorified for the “proposition to build positive
social impact into corporate purpose,” benefit corporations enabled businesses
to inherently value social goods.185 Yet, when they aim to profit monetarily
overall, for-profit businesses experience intrinsic limitations in their abilities
to promote social goods.186 Thus, if benefit corporations truly desired the
promotion of social good, they would instead incorporate as nonprofit
organizations.187 Instead, some argue that the ease of becoming a benefit
corporation enables inadequate social missions.188 One must consider these
criticisms when developing future legislation related to the benefit corporation
framework.
C. Treating Agricultural Benefit Corporations as NPOs
On the other end of the spectrum, some critics worry legislation governing
benefit corporations does not go far enough to reward these corporations
for their social contributions.189 Benefit corporations pledge to forego

183. California benefit corporations and regular for-profit corporations abide by the
same statute that limits liability of a director for monetary damages. See id. §§ 204(a)(10),
14620(i).
184. See David R. Sands, Benefit Corporations Raise Legal, Regulatory Questions,
WASH. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/7/benefit-corporationsraise-legal-regulatory-questi/ [https://perma.cc/JLK2-3DDQ].
185. Joanne Bauer & Elizabeth Umlas, Do Benefit Corporations Respect Human
Rights?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 27, 28 (Fall 2017), http://ssir.org/articles/entry/
do_benefit_corporations_respect_human_rights.
186. Id.
187. See generally Brackman Reiser, supra note 176 (noting that benefit corporations
rely on consumer diligence to ascertain their missions).
188. See Bauer & Umlas, supra note 185, at 29. Critics contend that benefit corporation
incorporation enables any company to become a benefit corporation so long as it strategically
commits to a social goal. Id. For example, in 2017, Nevada’s number of benefit corporations
divided in half to include pest control and pool services companies. Id. at 30. Laureate
Education, the first benefit corporation to go public—as well as the largest for-profit college
company worldwide—cites its social mission in part as “boosting ‘employment and social
mobility.’” Lauren Gensler, The World’s Biggest For-Profit College Company, Laureate
Education, Raises $490 Million in Public Debt, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/02/01/laureate-education-initial-public-offering/
#1212a18a2b3d [https://perma.cc/6QLK-PMV4]. However, some question Laureate’s ability
to provide a quality education considering its abysmal graduation rate in some countries
and its poor student-to-teacher ratio. Id.
189. See Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP.
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 17, 19 (2014). Kent Greenfield posits that leveling
the playing field to mandate attentiveness by all corporations would ensure attentiveness
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profit maximization in pursuit of goals that benefit society. Indeed, they
forewarn their shareholders of this reality and in return face less legal
backlash.190 Yet, what are benefit corporations actually getting other than
that warm fuzzy feeling?
Benefit corporation status does not adequately protect companies from
market pressure, critics contend, for two reasons. First, raising social
capital takes more time and effort than raising commercial capital, given
the demand of social investors.191 Second, “[b]ecause not all companies choose
to become benefit corporations, those that do will suffer competitive
disadvantages in the capital market, at least in the short term.”192 As a result,
benefit corporations—in addition to, and because of, the extra work they
put in—risk acquiring fewer shareholders.193 Current legislation rewards
these sacrifices with lessened liability, but the advantage is unclear because
for-profits may take advantage of loopholes to evade liability.194 Meanwhile,
the debate continues over whether benefit corporations should qualify for
special tax treatment, an advantage currently unavailable to benefit
corporations.
Some further hypothesize that because benefit corporations voluntarily
incur increased market pressure to advance social good they should qualify
for some degree of tax deduction in line with nonprofit treatment.195
However, affording benefit corporations special tax treatment might then
detract from nonprofit status.196 Specific concerns include the diversion
to social needs benefits a company. Id. As the legislation sits, benefit corporations receive
little benefit given market pressure and other obstacles. See id.
190. See Brackman Reiser, supra note 176, at 596.
191. Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (a Security): Funding For-Profit
Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U.L. REV. 299, 310 (2013) (quoting Timothy Ogden, The
True Cost of Social Capital, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.ssireview.
org/blog/entry/the_true_cost_of_social_capital [https://perma.cc/2HSN-3EPV]).
192. Greenfield, supra note 189, at 19 (emphasis added). It follows that past the shortterm, successful benefit corporations have proven themselves, and thus, social investors will be
less hesitant to invest.
193. Id. (noting that most investors are interested in gaining a profit and henceforth
are more likely to invest in commercial capital).
194. In theory, the benefit of benefit corporations is an avoidance of fiduciary duty;
however, for-profits can also avoid their fiduciary duty to a large extent by incorporating
carefully. See supra Section V.B.
195. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387, 422–23 (2014).
196. See id. at 391–92; see also Brian Kimball, Comment, Hybrid Business Organizations:
Reconciling Fiduciary Duty, Profit, and Social Purpose, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 931,
960 (2014) (explaining that a significant challenge to awarding special tax treatment to
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of needed funds from existing charities and the appearance of government
approval or oversight of the specific goal of any given corporation.197
Nonprofit organizations must comply with federal statute to gain tax
exemption.198 The main distinction between nonprofit organizations and
for-profit organizations is that the former are subject to a “nondistribution
constraint,” prohibiting them from dispersing surplus funds to owners or
shareholders.199 Instead, nonprofits must use surplus funds for stated
charitable or otherwise statute-acceptable purposes.200 Nonprofits that
operate exclusively for charitable purposes also afford the benefit of tax
exemption to their donors.201
Yet, some believe that benefit corporations, like nonprofits, “merit
special [tax] treatment due to their historical background, as a response to
market and government failures, as forces for pluralism, and as a mechanism
by which an individualistic society can express solidarity through joint
action.”202 Although benefit corporations do not have a nondistribution
constraint, some contend this is consistent with nonprofit policy.203 That
is, the combination of just compensation for nonprofit workers along with
nonprofit organization tax exemption is a relatively equal benefit to allowing
private inurement for benefit corporations.204 Both types of organizations
social enterprises such as benefit corporations is that they fail to meet the nonprofit
prohibition for individual inurement of benefit).
197. Because nonprofits receive tax exemption or subsidy with the stipulation that
they provide a charitable service, nonprofits attain government approval, acting as a natural
endorsement to the public. Hitoshi Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 195, at 397–400. Skeptics
fear any subsidy to other corporations who do not meet the charitable standard of nonprofits
will confuse the public into thinking that these corporations—benefit corporations—are
equally endorsed as nonprofits. Id. at 399–400. Because nonprofits have a private inurement
restriction, such confusion could harm nonprofit businesses two-fold: first, the emergence
of corporations other than nonprofits receiving special government tax treatment will
divert funds from nonprofits, and second; the public patrons will ignore the distinction
between nonprofits and other corporations, perceiving that the government approves equally of
benefit corporations and nonprofits. Id. at 397, 400.
198. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018).
199. Hitoshi Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 195, at 404 (quoting Henry Hansmann,
The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation,
91 YALE L.J. 34, 56–57 (1981)).
200. Id. (quoting Hansmann, supra note 199).
201. Id. at 405.
202. Kimball, supra note 196, at 960 (citing JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 30 (4th ed. 2010)). Just as the principle of
volunteerism serves as the historical precedent for special treatment for nonprofits, so too
should the principle of service to causes beyond self-interest form the basis of special tax
treatment for benefit corporations.
203. See id. at 961.
204. See id. Brackman Reiser points out benefit corporations’ vulnerability in
the present state of affairs: they lack “robust mechanisms to enforce dual mission[s], which
will ultimately undermine [their] ability to expand funding streams and create a strong
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pursue socially beneficial goals beyond the typical goals of for-profit
organizations.205 The difference: one receives a tax exemption while the
other may privately inure.206
Critics of affording benefit corporations special tax treatment conclude
that the halo bestowed upon nonprofits is not transferable.207 In addition
to the premise that nonprofits operate exclusively towards their charitable
purpose, leading tax scholar Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer explains that for-profits
that engage in charitable activity already have recourse for partial
benefits.208 For-profits need only distinguish between “contributions or
gifts” and “ordinary and necessary business expenses” to receive a tax
refund.209 Furthermore, critics contend that offering a tax incentive opens
the door to corporations left and right claiming social pursuits simply to
collect.210
Despite apparent majority insistence that the binary tax distinction should
remain, Professor Malani and Professor Posner have argued that the tax code
should be amended to provide tax incentives to businesses engaged in
social promotion, regardless of their status as nonprofit organizations.211
They reason “that the government should provide favorable tax treatment
for activities that eliminate the need for government action by providing

brand for social enterprise as sustainable organizations.” Brackman Reiser, supra note
176, at 593. Thus, special tax treatment would be a worthy solution given the comparison
of social good amongst nonprofits and benefit corporations. See Kimball, supra note 196,
at 961.
205. See Kimball, supra note 196, at 960–61.
206. See id.
207. “[T]he propensity of people to see nonprofits as more trustworthy than forprofits” is known as the “halo effect.” Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure
and the ACA: A Need for Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 103, 130 (2015).
208. See Hitoshi Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 195, at 408.
209. Id. at 408, 408 n.97 (quoting Rev. Rul. 72-314, 1972-1 C.B. 44); see also 26
U.S.C. § 162 (2018) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business [but
no] deduction shall be allowed . . . for any contribution or gift which would be allowable
as a deduction under section 170 . . . .”); id. § 170 (“There shall be allowed as a deduction
any charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable
contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary.”).
210. See Sands, supra note 184.
211. See Joseph M. Binder, Note, A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class of Hybrid
Entities, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 625, 640 (2013) (citing Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The
Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2064–65 (2007)).
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publicly beneficial goods or services” and that logically such treatment
cannot be restricted to nonprofit organizations.212 Additionally, they argue
that because principal business costs can be doctored, nonprofits have
flexibility with private inurement.213 That is, nonprofits can work less
efficiently and go on lavish conferences while still complying with the
nondistribution constraint.214 Thus, corporations that engage in activities
that benefit the public good should be rewarded for using their for-profit
structure to do so efficiently.215
Most modern scholars respond negatively to the pre-benefit corporation
rationale of Malani and Posner. First, critics claim that taxing benefit
corporations aligns with the goals of the tax system.216 Because benefit
corporations expect to earn a profit, they are able to pay taxes.217 Second,
that benefit corporations balance government failure is not concrete.218
Government failure occurs when a desired government program fails “to
attract a majority of votes.”219 The government will not provide the desired
good or service if only a minority of the population desires it.220 In this case,

212. Id. (citing Malani & Posner, supra note 211, at 2030–31).
213. Id. at 640–41 (citing Malani & Posner, supra note 211, at 2031).
214. See id. (citing Malani & Posner, supra note 211, at 2035); see, e.g., Dave
Philipps, Wounded Warrior Project Spends Lavishly on Itself, Insiders Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/us/wounded-warrior-project-spendslavishly-on-itself-ex-employees-say.html [https://perma.cc/AZH7-GXTN] (noting that in
2014 the charity flew out its 500 employees to a Colorado Springs five-star hotel in
celebration of a profitable year).
215. See Binder, supra note 211, at 641.
216. Id. at 656 (noting that taxing statutory benefit corporations is not fundamentally
at odds with the goals of the tax system because benefit corporations “contemplate earning
some profit”). Three accepted goals of the tax system include raising revenue to finance
public goods, redistributing income, and providing a means of government regulation.
Limor Riza, In Retrospect of 40 Years, Another Look at Andrews’ Personal Deductions
Argument: A Comparison of Charitable Contributions and Child-Care Expenses, 15
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 55, 57 (2016). The government provides distinct tax treatment
for nonprofit and for-profit businesses under the rationales that income tax should apply
to earnings and be measured in part by a taxpayer’s ability to pay the tax. See Binder,
supra note 211, at 638. Benefit corporations have earnings and can pay taxes—given that
they have no limitations on private inurement. Rick Bell & Devin Scott, Non-Profit
Corporation vs Public Benefit Corporation, DELAWAREINC.COM (July 2, 2018), https://
www.delawareinc.com/blog/non-profit-corporation-vs-public-benefit-corporation/ [https://
perma.cc/ST83-YBKQ].
217. Binder, supra note 211, at 656–57.
218. Id. at 657 (noting the skepticism regarding to what extent statutory benefit corporations
provide goods and services that the government would otherwise need to provide).
219. Kevin M. Yamamoto, Taxing Income from Mailing List and Affinity Card
Arrangements: A Proposal, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 243 (2001) (citing John D. Colombo,
Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational
Institutions, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 875 (1993)).
220. Id. (citing Colombo, supra note 219, at 874–75).
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nonprofit tax exemption acts as a subsidy to complement the government’s
failure to otherwise provide the desired good or service.221 Additionally,
the IRS provides benefit corporations with a broad scope of permissible
purposes, while nonprofits experience a restricted scope.222 Accordingly, the
government does not offer favorable tax treatment to benefit corporations
because it does not impose as narrow of requirements as it does upon
nonprofits.223
As illustrated above, the debate over preferential tax treatment for
benefit corporations remains inconclusive. However, if benefit corporations
balance government failure adequately, a certain subset might be due more
of a benefit. Thus, Part VI advocates for Congress to create a new class of
benefit corporation to reward agricultural companies that advance social
good.
VI. A NEW CLASS OF BENEFIT CORPORATION
A new class of benefit corporation will simultaneously boost agricultural
standards and consumer trust. Although benefit corporations are currently
legislated by states, federal hybrid corporation legislation is attainable.224
A federal benefit corporation tailored to the needs of the agricultural
industry is thus no huge divergence from current law.225 Accordingly, this
Comment proposes that Congress pass legislation that includes two main
components outside of the original benefit corporation framework. First,
in line with current benefit corporation structures of pursuing sociallyminded business goals, agricultural corporations that comply with industrial
practice transparency regulations will qualify for a tax incentive. Second,
to instill the prescribed mission of transparent, ethical standards, the new
class will require that employee representatives be board members.

221. Id. (citing Colombo, supra note 219, at 875).
222. See id. at 228 (citing I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000)).
223. See Emily Cohen, Note, Benefit Expenses: How the Benefit Corporation’s
Social Purpose Changes the Ordinary and Necessary, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 269,
274 (2013) (citing Malani & Posner, supra note 211, 2026).
224. Congress may regulate commerce among the several States. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. Given the existence of state hybrid corporations and the reality that nonprofit
corporations operate at the federal level, legislation of federal hybrid corporations is
constitutional. See Kimball, supra note 196, at 934.
225. Nonprofits are federally regulated under tax law; thus, a type of federal benefit
corporation would not be unprecedented. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); see also Kimball,
supra note 196, at 960.
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A. A Feasible Tax Incentive
1. Congressional Authority and ABCs as Worthy
Tax Incentive Recipients
Congress receives its authority to lay and collect taxes from Article I of
the Constitution.226 Congress imposes uniform taxes to “pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States.”227 Historically, the government has utilized tax incentives to
reduce taxes for individuals while encouraging targeted programs or
behaviors.228 In the nonprofit sector, individuals who donate to charities
receive tax exemption on their donation.229 Thus, tax exemption incentivizes
the behavior of donating to a good cause. For example, subsidies, deductions,
and exclusions for homeownership represent a mainstay social program
worthy of its billion-dollar cost to the federal budget—presumably because
226. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
227. Id. Courts have historically debated the meaning of “general Welfare.” See id.
James Madison held the view that “the power to tax was confined to the enumerated
legislative fields committed to Congress,” while Alexander Hamilton maintained that the
clause conferred “separate and distinct power,” substantively granting Congress the power
“to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States.” Jamess, America’s Misunderstood
Mission: Promoting the General Welfare, DAILY KOS (Nov. 2, 2014, 8:15 AM), https://
www.dailykos.com/stories/2014/11/2/1340978/-America-s-Misunderstood-MissionPromoting-the-general-Welfare [https://perma.cc/9A4F-88W4] (emphasis omitted). The
Court in United States v. Butler held the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA)
unconstitutional, siding with Hamilton’s notion of general welfare. See id. The Court
declared that the AAA’s intention on setting limits on the production of certain crops and
imposing taxes on the excessive production of such limits was unconstitutional because
the tax was proposed for extraneous reasons beyond the common, national welfare. United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). The Court further noted that because Congress is
not granted the power to regulate agricultural production, the power to tax on that basis is
prohibited and the Tenth Amendment controls. Id. But see 7 U.S.C. § 612(a) (2018)
(“There is appropriated [by the Treasury], the sum of $100,000,000 to be available to the
Secretary of Agriculture for administrative expenses . . . and for payments authorized to
be made under section 608 of this title.”); id. § 612(b) (“[A] sum equal to the proceeds
derived from all taxes imposed under this chapter is appropriated to the Secretary of
Agriculture for (1) the acquisition of any agricultural commodity pledged as security for
any loan made by any Federal agency, which loan was conditioned upon the borrower agreeing
or having agreed to cooperate with a program of production adjustment or marketing
adjustment adopted under the authority of this chapter, and (2) . . . [a]dministrative expenses,
payments authorized to be made under section 608 of this title, and refunds on taxes.”).
Thus, §§ 608 and 612 effectively allow for the Secretary of Agriculture to subsidize agricultural
commodities that are below the fair exchange value. See id. §§ 608, 612.
228. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. HARRIS ET AL., NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HOMEOWNERSHIP
TAX INCENTIVES 1315–17 (2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/43086/
1001710-new-perspectives-on-homeownership-tax-incentives.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6RW78RD].
229. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1).
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owning a home encourages saving, which boosts the economy and strengthens
the development of American communities.230 Therefore, to maintain
consistent tax policy, individuals or entities receiving tax deductions must
do something that directly or indirectly benefits society.
Benefit corporations, by definition, must provide a positive impact on
society.231 Yet, because they remain for-profit entities, state legislatures
do not limit their scope of societal goals.232 If the government starts
subsidizing traditional benefit corporations, however, some argue that the
public may perceive the government as endorsing corporations’ social goals.233
Such endorsement could diminish the halo effect of nonprofits. Furthermore,
despite all benefit corporations theoretically prescribing to do something
good for society, nonprofits arguably impact taxpayer welfare more directly.
Yet, in the case of agricultural corporations, the social goal of instilling
consumer trust and improving food production standards is objectively
worthy of endorsement, like that of a nonprofit.234 Regardless of a particular
corporation’s industry or product, consumer trust is a common area of
focus.235 In the agricultural industry, it is often a marketing strategy.236
Yet, frequent use of “shared values” language risks ambiguity depending
230. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 228, at 1317.
231. See supra Part V.
232. See supra Part V.
233. See THE REGISTRY, FOR PROFIT VERSUS NON-PROFIT 1–2 (2002), https://www.
the-registry.org/Portals/0/Documents/Credentials/Administrator/Documents/For%20Profit%
20versus%20Non.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT7T-3ZUW]. Because the government offers
special tax treatment to nonprofits, there is a real or perceived view that the organization
operates in the public interest. See id. As such, “[t]he public is more willing to offer money or
time to do business with a nonprofit.” Id. If the government started treating benefit
corporations similarly to nonprofits, the public would likely associate a comparable endorsement.
See id. But see MARK KRAMER & JOHN KANIA, A NEW ROLE FOR NONPROFITS (2006), https://
ssir.org/pdf/2006SP_sidebar_Kramer_Kania_new%20role%20for%20nonprofits.pdf [https://
perma.cc/83CP-JHPS] (positing that nonprofits control retaining their halos, at least in the
case of aligning with business partners).
234. Transparency enables consumers to make informed decisions about the food they
consume. See supra Part III.
235. See, e.g., Alyssa Conway, Consumer Trust and the Agriculture Industry:
Bridging the Gap, WATTAGNET (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.wattagnet.com/articles/25743consumer-trust-and-the-agriculture-industry-bridging-the-gap [https://perma.cc/2G8G-3X8Z];
Hembree Brandon, Agriculture’s Challenge: How to Counter Lack of Trust in Today’s Food
System, DELTA FARMPRESS (July 30, 2015), www.deltafarmpress.com/miscellaneous/agricultures-challenge-how-counter-lack-trust-today-s-food-system [https://perma.cc/6DG4-DTQ8].
236. See Conway, supra note 235 (noting how Tyson executive Christine Daughtery
advised women in the agribusiness industry to reach out to consumers regarding shared
values).

925

POST SMITH PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2018 10:26 AM

on the speaker.237 Although corporations themselves pursue improving
consumer trust, organizations such as the Center for Food Integrity aim to
collect consumer trust research with similar objectives.238 Therefore, the
desire for improved consumer trust warrants government endorsement.
Additionally, agricultural subsidies are already commonplace,239 making
the creation of a tax incentive for agricultural industries reasonable. In
some cases, existing subsidies are no longer necessary.240 Furthermore,
the rationale is to tip the scale in favor of compliant corporations, thus
incentivizing transparent, ethical standards.
One key area in which to tip the scale is animal agriculture. As discussed
in this Comment, animal agricultural standards are not only increasingly
deplorable but also increasingly censored.241 Despite deplorable conditions—
and although these industries actually produce less sustenance than would
equal subsidies to plant industries—the government continues to subsidize
meat and dairy industries.242 Giving subsidy preference to more transparent
237. Id.
238. See Brandon, supra note 235.
239. See generally JAYSON L. LUSK, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE USDA IN THE FOOD
AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/LuskUSDA-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ9W-TG8S]. The United States subsidized nearly nine
billion dollars to agricultural farms in 2016. See Subtotal, Farming Subsidies in the U.S.,
2016, EWG, https://farm.ewg.org/top_recips.php?fips=00000&progcode=totalfarm&yr=2016&
regionname=theUnitedStates [https://perma.cc/2TNF-4TP3]. Deline Farms, a partnership
whose main commodities include cotton, rice, soybeans, corn, and wheat, received four
million dollars in 2016. USDA Subsidy Information for Deline Farms Partnership, EWG,
https://farm.ewg.org/persondetail.php?custnumber=B05492376 [https://perma.cc/FK9R8JFU]. Napi, which grew corn, wheat, and barley, received 2.3 million dollars. USDA
Subsidy Information for Napi, EWG, https://farm.ewg.org/persondetail.php?custnumber=
A09396739 [https://perma.cc/P9SF-FCCU]. And Frische Farms, which grew corn, cotton,
sorghum, and wheat, received 2.2 million dollars. USDA Subsidy Information for Frische
Farms, EWG, https://farm.ewg.org/persondetail.php?custnumber=A09342293 [https://perma.cc/
7SMW-GLQH].
240. During the Great Depression, the USDA mandated price floors and bought surplus
crops to simultaneously subsidize farmers’ income and consumers’ ability to afford products.
LUSK, supra note 239, at 14. Some subsidies, such as the raisin subsidy implemented in the
1940s—and only recently struck down in 2015—are simply unnecessary today. Id. at 5.
241. See supra Part I.
242. See U.S. Could Feed 800 Million People with Grain that Livestock Eat, Cornell
Ecologist Advises Animal Scientists, CORNELL CHRON. (Aug. 7, 1997), http://news.cornell.edu/
stories/1997/08/us-could-feed-800-million-people-grain-livestock-eat [https://perma.cc/
TU6M-ZD64]. Since 1995, the U.S. government has paid out 10.3 billion dollars in livestock
subsidies alone, including over 136 million to the Cattle Feed Program and over 122 million to
the Small Hog Operation. Livestock Subsidies in the U.S. Totaled $10.3 Billion from 19952016, EWG, https://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=livestock [https://
perma.cc/RP5X-Y83Y]. Comprehensive studies estimate the total annual figure of meat
and dairy subsidies is thirty-eight billion dollars. David Robinson Simon, 10 Things We Wish
Everyone Knew about the Meat and Dairy Industries, PETA, https://www.peta.org/living/
food/10-things-wish-everyone-knew-meat-dairy-industries/ [https://perma.cc/TZ4W-LQRN].
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and ethical animal agricultural corporations and minimal or no subsidies
to those outside of a statutorily defined standard would enable the government
to monetarily incentivize Agriculture Benefit Corporations (ABCs).
Furthermore, as consumers pay the cost of these subsidies, reason warrants
that their tax money go toward lowering the price of food, so they can
make more informed decisions about purchasing.243 Depression-era policies
served the general public because nearly everyone was affected by the
Depression.244 Therefore, subsidies paid out through tax dollars to lower
the cost of food was a reasonable policy.245 With the economy in an improved
state of affairs today, this is no longer a reasonable practice.246 Instead,
the U.S. government should subsidize agriculture that improves transparency
because nontransparent agricultural corporations currently disserve the
general public.
Lowering or eliminating subsidies for other areas of agriculture could
also enable a tax provision for compliant corporations. For example,
studies suggest corn promotes obesity, suggesting subsidies may not only
be unnecessary but may also promote unhealthy food choices.247 Thus, if
the government eliminated or lowered its corn subsidy, it could increase
its ability to subsidize agricultural corporations practicing transparency.

One study analyzing U.S. farm subsidy programs—including crops, livestock, and dairy—
since 1986 reported that the value of USDA programs to the U.S. agriculture industry was
$180.8 billion in 2009, with the dairy industry receiving $19.3 billion. Grey, Clark, Shih
& Assocs., Ltd., Farming the Mailbox: U.S. Federal and State Subsidies to Agriculture,
CISION, http://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/farming-the-mailbox-us-federal-andstate-subsidies-to-agriculture-546401352.html [https://perma.cc/RGV2-6TNK]. The report stated
this amount included programs for “irrigation infrastructure support and unreported below
market price-cost water and power for irrigation systems,” summarizing that subsidies to
U.S. dairy producers acted as revenue from the marketplace, enabling “producers to sell
below their fully absorbed cost of production by insulating them from the need to earn a
profit from the market [and permitting] insulation from international price pressures.” Id.
243. See Christopher Hyner, A Leading Cause of Everything: One Industry That Is
Destroying Our Planet and Our Ability to Thrive on It, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. REV. (Oct.
23, 2015), https://gelr.org/2015/10/23/a-leading-cause-of-everything-one-industry-thatis-destroying-our-planet-and-our-ability-to-thrive-on-it-georgetown-environmentallaw-review/ [https://perma.cc/K4XH-DEAG].
244. See LUSK, supra note 239, at 14.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 6–8.
247. See generally MANUELA MONTERO, WHY THOSE PRO-HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN
SYRUP COMMERCIALS ARE [BS] (2012), https://matadornetwork.com/change/why-thosepro-high-fructose-corn-syrup-commercials-are-bullshit-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/
PQY9-4DYY].
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In fact, a shift in policy could enable corn producers to retain part of their
subsidies if they simply disclosed more information on their content and
practices, thereby shifting power back to consumers to make informed
food choices. Therefore, considering rampant discussion regarding subsidy
inadequacies, transforming current subsidy allocations is one feasible way
to enable a tax incentive for transparent agricultural corporations.
2. Dangers of Agricultural Subsidy Reform
Despite the proposal’s aim to incentivize and propel industry changes
via special tax treatment to ABCs, current leaders of the industry—particularly
those currently receiving subsidies—may not change their ways. By
diminishing existing subsidies for some corporations, entities could begin
taking shortcuts to save money, effectively harming consumers. For example,
if dairy companies must fully disclose hormone use or cow living conditions
to keep their subsidies but refused to comply, would their standards get
worse upon losing their subsidies? Would dairy companies using untreated
cows suddenly enlist the use of the dangerous hormone rbST to increase
milk production248 without incurring extra costs?
Although this is a possibility, reason points to the alternative outcome.
First, even if stubborn companies fail to see the benefit of engaging in
better practices and pledging transparency, the benefit of a tax incentive
would encourage many corporations to sign up. Naturally, consumers will
favor products serving their best interest.249 As such, to remain competitive
with compliant organizations, reluctant organizations that previously refused
to comply would have increased incentive to change to appeal to more
consumers and achieve maximum profits.250 In the case of milk, producers
248. Collier, supra note 76.
249. See Starostinetskaya, supra note 103.
250. An incentive program differs from the AAA, which sought to tax corporations
that engaged in over-production. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1936).
Despite the AAA’s utilization of economic pressure to coerce compliance by corporations,
the incentive of ABCs is simply a reward for engaging in best practices that help the
consumer. Id. at 59, 75; Jamess, supra note 227. Furthermore, ABCs would not violate
Antitrust law, for there is no restraint of trade or price-fixing involved. See 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2018). Even a liberal prediction of the ABC program’s success would not succumb to an
antitrust violation. See id. That is, if the main goal of the ABC structure was to restrain
competition from certain corporations and enhance or maintain prices for certain agricultural
commodities, it would first have to exclude a subset of all agricultural corporations. See
15 id. (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nation, is declared
to be illegal.”). Second, in the case of a section two violation, such a scenario would need
to tend to produce a monopoly. See id. § 2. The only way in which a monopoly could
arise out of the ABC structure would be if only the largest corporations took advantage of
it, which is very unlikely. See id. (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
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still using hormones would suffer. No longer able to take advantage
of consumer ignorance and facing the market shift toward plant-based
products, these producers would have added incentive to comply with the
statute.251 Second, corporations already practicing due diligence would
likely embrace the opportunity to maintain a subsidy in the name of consumer
trust.
B. Utilizing Employee Board Members to Account for Social
Compliance
Next, utilizing lower-level employee members on agricultural corporation
boards offers an additional level of review to account for proper standard
implementation.252 As an added benefit, employee board members strengthen
advocacy for employee interests.253
Central to the agricultural discussion, employee board members provide
an additional level of accountability to the assessment of the corporation’s
mission. As of 2015, a majority of the twenty-eight states of the European
Union plus Norway included employee board-level representatives.254 In
Germany, for instance, as many as half of the members of a given board
are employee representatives.255 Including employees on boards provides
additional managerial oversight, increases employees’ enthusiasm to work, and
enables longer-term perspectives on performance.256 Managerial oversight by
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.”).
251. Studies show that the exposure of detrimental effects of dairy in recent years
has caused a dramatic decline in dairy consumption. See Michael Pellman Rowland, Got
Milk? A Tale of Two Cities, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaelpellmanrowland/2017/04/11/milk-industry-controversy/#755ce41757e5
[https://perma.cc/R5V2-S4SZ].
252. See generally Eric Engle & Tetiana Danyliuk, Emulating the German Two-Tier
Board and Worker Participation in U.S. Law: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 45 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 69 (2015).
253. See generally id.
254. Board Level Representation, WORKER-PARTICIPATION, https://www.worker-participation.
eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2 [https://perma.cc/
4AGJ-VVS4].
255. Id. German corporations are constructed on a two-tier board model separating
oversight and supervisory functions. Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 252, at 104–05. Board
members on one tier cannot serve on the other. Id. at 104. Worker representation on
the supervisory board of larger companies is guaranteed by law. Id.
256. Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 252, at 85.
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employees is especially useful in monitoring adherence to societal impact
missions, as employees earning less tend to have a more benign outlook
when working for societally-beneficial organizations.257
Employees benefit from the election of employee board level representatives.
First, having employee members on the board automatically gives employees
access to the court system, as current corporate law enables board members
to bring derivative suits against a corporation.258 Additionally, a greater
ratio of employees on the board enables more direct assessment of employee
concerns.259 For example, with a level playing field for shareholders and
employees, a fair dialogue regarding arbitration options could take place.260
Furthermore, employee representation will lessen labor–management conflicts
and create more effective work ethic “due to greater commitment and
improved communication.”261
Yet, some may resist the inclusion of employees on boards. Perhaps
the employee representative model works in Europe because European
boards operate on a two-tier system, separating strategic, supervisory roles
from operational ones.262 “Oversight is exercised by a supervisory board
of directors, while management of operations is implemented by a managerial
board of directors.”263 Many directors value this structure, called corporatism,
based on the theory that labor and management operate best cooperatively.264
Typically, employee board members only preside on the operational tier.
This makes sense given the clear conflict of interest likely to arise over
discussions of budgetary matters and the like. Additionally, employee members
likely lack qualifications regarding supervisory, strategic, and long-term

257. Theoretically, employees are more concerned with earning a wage than with its
employer making profits. Moreover, benefit corporation employees likely choose to work
with a corporation with a certain mission because they also take pride in it. See, e.g., Mike
Isaac & David Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism Over Profit, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstartersaltruistic-vision-profits-as-the-means-not-the-mission.html [https://perma.cc/QU72-R9D6].
258. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see also Shaikh, supra note 160, at 253 (citing CAL.
CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(1)–(2) (2017)).
259. See Shaikh, supra note 160, at 253 (citing CORP. §§ 14601(c), 14620(b)(2)–(3)).
260. See id. at 252.
261. See Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 252, at 112 (citing DAVID B. REYNOLDS, TAKING
THE HIGH ROAD: COMMUNITIES ORGANIZE FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 45 (2002)).
262. Id. at 104 (citing Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept.
6, 1995, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I], § 30 (Ger.)).
263. Id. (citing AktG § 30) (emphasis omitted).
264. Id. at 86. Corporatism, which originated in Europe, assumes that within a mixed
economy involving “government industry and intervention in areas of public goods, . . .
large concentrations of corporate power are inevitable because of natural monopoly.” Id.
(citing Peter Muchlinski, The Development of German Corporate Law Until 1990: An Historical
Reappraisal, 14 GERMAN L.J. 339, 370 (2013)). To regulate the potential abuses of concentrated
economic power, a system where labor and management interact cooperatively is ideal.
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planning issues. Further, such matters could combat the intended purpose
of including employees on boards—to strengthen communication and
work ethic—by exposing them to functional aspects of the business, which
the employee is unlikely to understand nor appreciate.
Although the United States operates on a single-tier corporate governance
structure265—all board members address operational and supervisory
issues—committees are commonplace.266 Thus, an executive committee
or session could naturally exclude employees from worker-sensitive discussions
of issues posing conflicts of interest. Such separation—often imposed in
nonprofit corporations where workers must voluntarily recuse themselves
from conflicting situations—provides a mechanism whereby the awkward
recusal and rejection process can be eliminated altogether.267 Therefore,
extending the attributes of the two-tier corporate structure would be plausible
in a single-tier framework with the existence of committees. Such a structure
allows employees to serve as an extra check to board members.
C. Proposed ABC Statute Elements
In addition to the traditional benefit corporation elements, the proposed
legislation should include a tax provision and employee board member
requirement to effectively incentivize agricultural corporations to improve
their practices.
1. Traditional Benefit Corporation Elements
Common elements of state benefit corporation statutes include having
a worthy social objective, acknowledging leniency regarding profit
maximization, complying with annual reports surveyed by a third party,
and agreeing by a defined percentage of board members prior to becoming
265. Id. at 87.
266. Kevin D. Chen & Andy Wu, The Structure of Board Committees 1 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-032, 2016).
267. See Jeremy Barlow, The Executive Board’s Roles and Responsibilities, BOARD
EFFECT (June 15, 2016), www.boardeffect.com/blog/executive-boards-roles-and-responsibilities
[https://perma.cc/SX27-LNEF]; see, e.g., Jailyn Anderson, Teachers Protest Proposed
Budget Cuts as School Board Votes Down Possible Charter School, OAKLAND NORTH
(Nov. 9, 2017 5:33 PM), https://oaklandnorth.net/2017/11/09/teachers-protest-proposedbudget-cuts-as-school-board-votes-down-possible-charter-school/ [https://perma.cc/ZCW4CTQA] (showcasing an instance where a nonprofit school board may want to exclude teachers
from voting on budgetary matters that would directly affect their salaries, as teachers would be
biased).
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a benefit corporation.268 The ABC statute proposed in this Comment uses
California’s benefit corporation statute as a model, modified to represent
the interests of agricultural corporations.269
First, although the existing statute speaks of compliance with a “general
public benefit” that controls the corporation’s purpose plus any specific
purpose it sets forth in its articles of incorporation, the ABC statute shall
impose a “consumer public benefit,” defined as a material positive impact
on society and the environment, as assessed against a third-party standard
prescribing full disclosure of content and conditions of production.270 The
terms within this definition shall be further defined within the ABC
statute. The definition of “third-party standard” shall remain as defined in the
California model,271 except that it shall assess overall consumer public benefit
performance. “Content” shall be defined as including all ingredients and
additives, including antibiotics, hormones, and genetically modified organisms.
“Conditions of production” shall include detailed descriptions of production
practice, such as spatial and sustenance allocations per crop or animal,
USDA audit frequency, and worker duties. “Full disclosure” is defined
as annual reports made available to the public. Although this section cannot
alter existing labeling requirements,272 it will encourage disclosures made
on annual reports to appear on food labels as well.
Next, the ABC statute’s fiduciary duty language should be stricter than
the California statute’s language to promote consumer trust in the mission
of transparency.273 In describing the “[p]erformance of duties by director,”
268. See Alexander, supra note 158, at 243.
269. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14602 (2018) (“[T]he articles shall . . . state that the
corporation is a benefit corporation and shall identify any specific public benefit adopted
pursuant to Section 14610.”).
270. Id. § 14610 (“A benefit corporation shall have the purpose of creating general
public benefit. This purpose is in addition to, and may be a limitation on, the corporation’s
purpose . . . and any specific purpose set forth in its articles . . . .”). Further defining the
term consumer public benefit is necessary because such a benefit is not present in existing
statutes. The benefit extends beyond a general public benefit, a term which is well known,
at least in the corporate law sector. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Nov. 12, 2018)
(noting that thirty-four states have passed benefit corporation statutes to date, with six
states working on it, which implies a general understanding of the public benefit concept).
271. CORP. § 14601(g) (“‘Third-party standard’ means a standard for defining, reporting,
and assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance . . . .”).
272. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2018).
273. Whether one is in the camp that believes benefit corporations are no different
than regular for-profits or in the camp that believes benefit corporations should do more
to deserve their benefit, the California statute’s language seems to completely contradict
the concept of benefit corporations: that, embedded within the fiduciary duty, there should
be a penalty for the benefit corporation’s failure to fulfill its general or specific public
benefit. See CORP. § 14620(f). Whether one believes that corporate law in general affords
too many loopholes for directors to evade liability and that this reality might as well extend
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a director shall “be liable for monetary damages under this part for any
failure of the benefit corporation to accomplish its consumer public
benefit.”274 Additionally, there will be no clause providing for elimination
of director liability for breach of the director’s duties to the corporation
and its shareholders, nor to a person that is a beneficiary of the consumer
public benefit.275 Lastly, an existing corporation may amend its articles
in line with the California statute to become an ABC with adoption by a
minimum status vote of at least two-thirds of the shareholders.276
By employing stricter fiduciary duty language than California’s statute,
the ABC statute will promote consumer trust in the mission of transparency,
disabling loopholes that allow directors to avoid benefit corporation
compliance.
2. Additional ABC Elements
In addition to the traditional benefit corporation elements, the ABC statute
will include a tax provision and employee board member requirement.
First, the tax code will include a provision like the nonprofit subsection.277
The provision will offer a tax deduction similar in amount to current
subsidy allocations. Referencing the ABC statute, a corporation described
in subsection x shall receive special tax treatment as follows. From here
a subsidy outline would project any given corporation’s deduction.
Theoretically, the existing subsidy slate would be wiped clean to reformulate
available subsidies to compliant corporations on an equal distribution basis,
considering product cost. The idea is not to create reliance, but to offer a

to benefit corporations or any corporation organizing under the for-profit framework, at
the very least, a federal statute offering benefits should strictly conform to the classic
attributes of both fiduciary duty—liability—and benefit corporations—achieving social
missions. For the classic attribute of fiduciary duty, see 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (2010). For the attribute
of the benevolent corporations, see 1A id. § 79.
274. CORP. § 14620(g).
275. See id. §§ 204(a)(10), 309(c), 14620(g)–(i).
276. See id. §§ 14603(a), 14601(d).
277. See 26 I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(7) (2018) (“An organization described in subsection
(c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle . . . .”).
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benefit.278 As such, through the use of a reformed, shared subsidy system,
total agricultural subsidies would decrease.279
Additionally, the ABC statute should include language requiring lowerlevel employee board members. Although utilizing committees to insulate
employee board members from conflicts of interest is encouraged, that
choice should ultimately be left up to the company. As such, the ABC
statute will not dictate such a requirement. Given that the aforementioned
amendment to the California statute enables beneficiaries of the consumer
public benefit to sue directors, the employee board member requirement
should be flexible, depending on the corporation size. Thirty to 50% of
the supervisory portion of the board should be made up of employees.
Thus, the language of the ABC statute should include in its “Formation”
description that “[a] benefit corporation shall be formed in accordance
[with state corporation law] except that the articles shall also state that the
corporation is a benefit corporation and shall” adhere to employee board
member requirements.280 Employee board member requirements would
subsequently be defined. In line with the German model, the largest
corporations should contain 50% employee representation.281
The ABC statute sets a high bar to gain the worthy reward of special
tax treatment. By simultaneously incentivizing compliance of transparent
agricultural standards and boosting accountability through employee board
representatives, the ABC statute provides a balanced approach to improving
consumer information.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the last decade, activists, exposés, and simple consumer diligence
have played active roles in transforming the climate of both consumer
awareness and standards in the agricultural industry. Ten years ago, most
people still bought into the notion that milk “does a body good.”282 In

278. “The largest 15 percent of farm operations and the richest farmers and landowners . . .
receive over 85 percent of all farm subsidies. . . . [O]nly 4 percent of U.S. farms produce
two-thirds of all agricultural sales.” Alison Acosta Winters, How Agriculture Subsidies
Are Hurting Farmers, Taxpayers, HILL (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/
congress-blog/economy-budget/309575-how-agriculture-subsidies-are-hurting-farmerstaxpayers [https://perma.cc/LY4V-UP6Y]. Thus, the notion that existing subsidies protect
vulnerable corporations is inaccurate and worthy of reform. See id.
279. See id.
280. CORP. § 14602.
281. See Board Level Representation, supra note 254. The German model prescribes
for corporations containing over 2,000 employees to have 50% employee representation
and corporations of 500 or less to exclude employee representatives. Id.
282. Pellman Rowland, supra note 251.
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response to this progression, however, some corporations have pushed
back even more vehemently.283
Although existing standards regarding disclosures on food labels aim to
inform consumers, ultimately, they oversimplify or omit critical information.284
Until Congress believes that the “consumer learning curve” is up to
speed285 or that science is definitive enough,286 the current landscape projects
the notion that too much information poses a threat of misleading consumers.287
Amidst such a veil, even the diligent consumer cannot escape the reality
that some producers may legally hide practices that would otherwise violate
the average consumer’s expectations and, possibly, the health code.288
As distrust of federal agencies rises amidst notions that suspicious
corporations’ interests are propelled via their ties to Washington,289 the
need for increased consumer trust is paramount. As tempting as making
agricultural subsidies contingent upon abolishing unnatural products and
harmful practices is, a federal regulation forcing agricultural corporations
to change is simply unreasonable. Labeling standards and precedent will
not change overnight. Additionally, despite its flaws, the current USDA
framework affords states great flexibility in legislating for themselves—a
right they would resist giving up in our federalist society.290 In an effort
to regain consumer trust, improve consumer knowledge, and incentivize
transparent agricultural standards, this Comment advocates the development
of a federal benefit corporation class. Such an offering would give compliant
agricultural companies alone the benefit of special tax treatment—if they
choose—so long as they pledged to practice transparency and adhere to

283. Some corporations attempt to censor conduct and conditions, manipulate and
change existing laws, and ignore accountability threatening the health and informed
decision-making of the average consumer. See supra Part II; see also Meyers, supra note
46 (highlighting proposed legislation in Arkansas that would criminalize the documentation of
malfeasance on private property); O’Connor, supra note 96 (noting the dairy industry’s
attempt to prevent plant-based companies from labeling their products as milk, cheese,
and yogurt).
284. See Houston, supra note 113 (“[S]horthand endorsement of attributes [on labels]
precludes the consumer from making informed choices.”).
285. Id. Critics claim that progressive labeling standards serve as insufficient disclosure
when they are implemented ahead of the “consumer learning curve.” Id.
286. The USDA and critics assert that regulations lacking a scientific basis create
“consumer deception.” Dhyani, supra note 122, at 43; see also Heid, supra note 146.
287. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2010).
288. See supra Part II.
289. See Boschma, supra note 141.
290. See supra Section IV.A.
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the requirements of the class. By rewarding honesty in the agricultural industry,
everyone wins: complacent corporations remain inactive, transparent
corporations gain a benefit, and consumers gain the power of informed
decision-making and improved health.
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